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Ethical Theory and Legal Philosophy
Stanley D. Rose*
jurisprudence and ethics, the author believes, represent distinct
efforts to achieve values in society. However, because of their similar
methodA, bases in fact, and testing by consequences, each has something
to give the other. With this in mind, the article examines the work of
contemporary writers in ethics both to determine what exactly are their
positions and to see what they might offer the student of jurisprudence.
This question of ought, turning ultimately on a theory of values, is the hardest
one dn jurisprudence.
Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HaRv. L. REv. 697, 703
(1931).
[Pound's] observations about the purpose of law stop where a real legal
philosophy ought to begin.
Radbruch, Anglo-American Jurisprudence Through Continental Eyes, 52 L.Q.
REv. 530, 542 (1936).
[T]here is an extraordinary naivet6 in the view that insensitiveness to the
demands of morality and subservience to state power in a people like the
Germans should have arisen from the belief that law might be law though it
failed to conform with the minimum requirements of morality. . . . But
something more disturbing than naivet6 is latent in Radbruch's whole presenta-
tion of the issues.. . . We can see in his argument that he has only half
digested the spiritual message of liberalism which he is seeking to convey to
the legal profession.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAuv. L. REv.
593, 617-18 (1958).
[O]ne is not reassured to see even so moderate a man as Professor Hart in-
dulging in some pretty broad strokes of the oar.
Let us put aside at least the blunter tools of invective.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAuv.
L. RFv. 630, 658 (1958).
I believe neither his [Lon Fuller's] description of current ethical theory nor
his wholesale condemnation of it is well informed ....
Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 NATuRAL L.F. 26, 41 (1959).
I. TBE PLACE OF ETHICS IN JumsPRuDENcE
The above quotations are intended to indicate the existence of a problem
and to suggest that there is a difference of opinion concerning proposed
* Attorney, Civil Division, Department of Justice.
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solutions to the problem. The issue is that of the application or relationship
of ethical theories to legal philosophy.
Most legal philosophers agree that if their work is to be significant they
must discuss such questions as: What is justice? What standard can be
used to determine what the law ought to be or in what direction it ought
to move? If we work out a set of jural postulates for a time and place, we
ought to have some mechanism for adjusting them to conflicting new wants
of civilization and for adjusting them in favor of what are regarded as
more desirable wants. These ideas all relate to the values we desire in
our society.
An example of the place of ethics in the law can be suggested by the
efforts of Justice Cardozo to illuminate the judicial process from the point
of view of the judge. He attempted to describe how the mind of the
judge was given direction.
The genesis, the growth, the function, and the end of law-the terms seem
general and abstract, too far dissevered from realities, raised too high above the
ground, to interest the legal wayfarer. But believe me, it is not so. It is these
generalities and abstractions that give direction to legal thinldng, that sway the
minds of judges, that determine, when the balance wavers, the outcome of the
doubtful lawsuit. Implicit in every decision where the question is, so to speak, at
large, is a philosophy of the origin and aim of law, a philosophy which, however
veiled, is in truth the final arbiter.1
We may not always be conscious of this propulsion, but it is there. For
this reason, as the Justice said: "If we cannot escape the Furies, we shall
do well to understand them." He then undertook to show the elements
that go into the genesis and growth of the law. Adopting Roscoe Pound's
belief that the end of law is the harmonious satisfaction of wants of people,
he comes at last to the key problem of the judge. At this point he says:
In the present state of our knowledge, the estimate of the comparative value
of one social interest and another, when they come, two or more of them, into
collision, will be slhaped for the judge, as it is for the legislator, in accordance
with an act of judgment in which many elements cooperate. It will be shaped
by his experience of life; his understanding of the prevailing canons of justice
and morality; his study of the social sciences; at times, in the end, by his
intuitions, his guesses, even his ignorance or prejudice.2
What is of interest to us in this present essay, is how Justice Cardozo
thinks a judge determines the content of justice. The freedom to decide
is not without limitation. "The judge must subordinate his personal or sub-
1. CApanozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 25-26 (1924). When we find the doubtful
case that will not fit into any existing theories or principles, "the choice that will approve
itself to this judge or to that, will be determined largely by his conception of the end
of law, the function of legal liability; and this question of ends and functions is a
question of philosophy." Id. at 101.
2. Id. at 85-86.
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jective estimate of value to the estimate" declared by the legislature.3 He
may not reject values existing in society with which he personally disagrees.
But Cardozo is clear that the place to look is in society itself: "Sooner or
later, if the demands of social utility are sufficiently urgent, if the operation
of an existing rule is sufficiently productive of hardship or inconvenience,
utility will tend to triumph."4
He describes how the judge "finds his moral value through his readings
of one social mind."5 But, again, it is repeated that social pressures will
prevail if these readings go awry.
[A] judge in his search for objective estimates of value is helpless to establish
standards that will block the onward movement of civilization as civilization is
conceived of at any given place or epoch .... [However,] the judge, if he may
not halt the march of civilization, may do something at times to moderate its
pace, to mitigate its ruthless quality.
This is all explainable because the function of judges "is not to transform
civilization, but to regulate and order it."6
As a conclusion, we can see that for Cardozo, "the judge, so far as
freedom of choice is given to him, tends to a result that attaches legal
obligation to the folkways, the norms or standards of behavior exemplified
in the life about him."" Thus, the main line of advance is towards the
actual desired. There will never be a total ignoring of what ought to be
desired, the desirable, but the emphasis for the most part will be upon
what we now want and how to get it without a total break with the con-
tinuum of present experience.8 The judge's projection of present desires
gives motion to the legal system but note that this projection does not, of
necessity, entail a consideration as to whether the direction is up or down,
good or bad. This seems to stop the judicial process short at the gate to
ethics as can be quickly demonstrated:
The cry for bringing law into harmony with the conditions of the times tacitly
assumes that the law will be better law when this has been done. That tacit
assumption is justifled so long as 'good law' is deflned as la* which is in harmony
with the conditions of the times. But if there have been, and are, as few will
deny, retrogressive civilizations, that is, civilizations which have moved in time
from a higher to a lower level of powers over internal and external nature, it
must be obvious that the process of bringing their law into harmony with their
3. Id. at 94.
4. Id. at 117.
5. CArnozo, TEE PAaDoxzs OF LEGAL SCrENCE 54 (1928).
6. Id. at 58-59.
7. Id. at 15. On Cardozo, see Rooney, Mr. Justice Cardozo's Relativism, 19 NEw
ScHoLArmcism 1 (1945) (with bibliography); Aronson, Cardozo's Doctrine of Socio-
logical jurisprudence, 4 J. OF Soc. Pim. 5 (1938).
8. "[O]ne of the most obvious and obstinate facts about human beings is that they
operate in and respond to traditions, and especially to such traditions as are offered to
them by the crafts they follow. Tradition grips them, shapes them, limits them, guides
them .... " LLEWELLYN, THE COMMnON LAw TaADrrON 53 (1960).
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later state, is a process of degradation of the law from the level of harmony with
a higher to that of harmony with a lower civilization. 9
We thus meet head-on the suggestion of harmony and change not being
necessarily good. And we have not yet considered what constitutes the
good, nor even, whether the term "good" is properly used in this connec-
tion.
Cardozo's dislike of the tyranny of legal concepts' 0-his view that "the
social value of a rule has become a test of growing power and impor-
tance, produces a flexibility and a relativism that make it all the more
imperative that, if this is the prevailing view today, we seek answers to
questions that are implicit in such views. For, traditionally, men have
asked about the nature of ethical principles, the ultimate good, and how
we can know such things. It is hard to avoid the feeling that such matters
are not in our control, if a judge must bow to what the social mind al-
legedly wants. But Cardozo speaks of the moral urges of judges. There
may be something there, and the form and content of such urges will be a
prime issue throughout this essay.
Another giant in legal philosophy, Roscoe Pound, has always said that
we must have a set of values by which to test our legal rules. He makes
constant reference to the ideal element in the law, and yet, he will not
argue the point. He persists in saying that the objective of the legal system
is the smooth and frictionless achievement of the maximum number of
claims and demands of citizens. This, he says, is value enough. This objec-
tive arouses the opposition of those who are apparently used to more
elaborate ethical systems. This argument isn't enough, they say. Some de-
mands are more desirable than others. Some are worth having even though
it creates friction to get them. Pound has recently begun to ask for only
a maximum number of reasonable expectations. It is arguable that this is
begging the question by assuming a built-in value system. But let us
assume not.
According to Pound, "an interest is a demand or desire which human
beings either individually or in groups seek to satisfy .. .."12 An interest
therefore is a fact that is empirically determinable. There either is or is
not, for example, an interest or claim of the husband to the services of his
9. Stone, A Critique of Pound's Theory of Justice, 20 IowA L. tzv. 531, 545-46
(1935). STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 362-63 (1950). On the dis-
integration of civilizations see 4-6 ToYnEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (1939). Stone's
argument seems to be a mere debating point. There is no empirical method of deter-
mining the direction of a civilization at any particular time.
10. "A fruitful parent of injustice is the tyranny of concepts. They are tyrants
rather than servants when treated as real existences and developed with merciless dis-
regard of consequences to the limit of their logic." CAn ozo, THE PARoxEs OF LEGAL
ScIuc 61 (1928).
11. CARuozo, Trm NATURE OF THE JUDicIAL PROCESS 73 (1921).
12. POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 96 (5th ed. 1943).
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wife. There is no value or ethical question involved in finding or identi-
fying such interests. These determinations are entirely empirical. But when
the legal system enters the picture and defines or limits the interests in de-
tail and announces the extent to which that interest will be protected, then
a choice has been made and one value accepted over another. For example,
suppose that a decision was made not to give the husband the right to
service X from his wife on the ground that to give such a right would
be an excessive derogation of the wife's individuality. It was the legal sys-
tem that set in motion the ethical problem. The question to be asked now
is: "By what standard was the husband denied this right to service X from
his wife?"
Two other American professionals in legal philosophy who have at-
tempted to use ethical theory in their work have been Lon Fuller and
Jerome Hall. Professor Fuller is developing his views and it may be pre-
mature to say where he will end up. In a full scale debate, he ran into a
rather formidable opponent with as yet unanswered results.' 3 Jerome Hall
some years ago set down his views about law as valuation. These opinions
may be briefly examined primarily with the purpose of indicating that this
is an open field for any legal scholar.
In Living Law of Democratic Society,14 Hall argued that because law is
a coalescence of rule with value, he had to examine the problems of ethics.
The basic ethical question that he asks is: "What is the best explanation of
the meaning of our moral experience?" 15 For Hall, the best theories are
those which rely on intuition and coherence.
He assumes that ethics are a kind of knowledge "as valid, if less rigorous,"
as that upon which science produces. Where does this knowledge come
from? Intuition. "Intuitive knowledge is the direct apprehension of a fact
or idea, exhibited in a flash but, often, only after much preliminary study
and reflection."16 He would have it that moral duties come as intuitive
truths. Then comes the retreat; "what must be emphasized, however, is
that a large part of ethical knowledge is not intuitive." Hall draws a dis-
tinction between moral knowledge and right action and "right action ...
depends mostly on more or less established opinions."17 The factors which
blunt our evaluations of moral situations, such as ignorance and prejudice,
lead to "imperfect intuitions." The validity of these "more or less probable
13. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NATuRAL. L.F. 68 (1958); Nagel,
On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3 NATutRAL L.F. 77
(1958); Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL L.F. 83 (1958); Nagel,
Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 NATurAL L.F. (1959).
14. HALL, LIVING LAw OF D~mocRAxrc Socima (1949).
15. Id. at 72.
16. Id. at 74. Hall knows that professional ethical opinion attacks this position but
he puts forth the claim of common sense "and that is the relevant one for matters of
legal significance." Id. at 74 n.71.
17. Id. at 76.
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opinions is established by reflection, logical analysis, reference to (coher-
ence with) other experience, and the consensus of experienced, unbiased
persons."18
The test of right as what an unprejudiced observer would approve is
subject to two objections. If the phrase be interpreted as what an observer
who judged rightly would approve it simply adopts the is of the observer
as the ought for other men. If the phrase means what an observer who was
not affected by any personal feeling of friendship or antipathy towards
the particular people concerned would approve, then the objection may be
raised that ethical mistakes occur for reasons other than because people
are affected by these feelings, and the objectivity of the observer therefore
becomes irrelevant.'9
To support this view, Hall points to the "very large area of morality
common to many peoples." And the prime example is the common dis-
approval of murder, rape, and theft.
With the above as a basis for moral knowledge and with one reminder
"that with reference to many problems, the best attainable knowledge is
not scientific, but is only an explanation that satisfies our common sense
more than does any competing theory,"2 0 Hall turns his attention to the
advocacy of a natural law theory.
We are thus in the position of Cardozo's judge in that, if given a free
choice, we arrive at the right solution either by intuition or by a more
varied process involving reflection, comparison with other cultures, and
consensus among "informed unbiased persons."
We shall see that the concept of intuitions is an amorphous one that most
certainly does not act like a flash of light. It would also seem that the
other alternative has, historically, hardly ever produced the desired
unanimity. How can I know I am right when reflection leads other people
in diverse paths? What is an informed unbiased person? These sort of
questions will not faze Professor Hall. He has already said that common
sense and right action are really our objectives. Few ethical philosophers
would agree with this. I take it that Professor Hall is not talking about
ethics at all, but is concerned about the moral customs within a particular
society. The ethical principles within such a society are already determined
and any change in such principles is a glacial process, although Hall has
18. "How are we to choose among the vast masses of material and how are we to
organize them? The skeptic may, in answer to such a methodological question, develop
a purely formal attitude based upon a critical appraisal of the limits of human under-
standing, or he may turn to common sense, the communis opinio doctorum and similar
notions. These variations of common sense, like formalism itself, hide rather than
solve the philosophical problems because the question is precisely where the standards
for evaluation of the common men whose common sense is being acclaimed come
from?" FIDiucHr, THE PHmosoply OF LAw IN HIsTorucAL PERSPECTnIVE 165 (1958).
19. EwING, SzcoND TkouGnrs IN MoaLr. Pnmosopity 20 (1959).
20. HAIL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 73.
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no doubt of the reality of moral progress.2 ' The books we will examine
would dispute and reject virtually every sentence he has written.
The writers just mentioned have in common a desire to make clear the
moral foundations of our law. In each case we have been brought to the
point of realizing that they are discussing problems that have a wide back-
ground. This background includes the field of learning called ethics which
considers problems that have concerned men, so far as we know, at all
times in human history.
But this is not an historical essay. Our interest is here confined to the
work of contemporary writers in ethics, mostly British and American, and
a consideration of what they might possibly have to offer to students of
jurisprudence.
II. Thm NATuRE OF MoDm ETmcA THREoRY
The quotations which introduce this essay seem to be in accord that
ethical theories are important and also seem to imply that the other fellow's
theory is not very good. To clarify what is at stake requires an under-
standing of what underlies the disagreement. Because ethics is a large and
difficult field of scholarship requiring special attention, it is not appropriate
to look for guidance to the legal philosophers who have adopted ethical
theories. It appears preferable to turn to those who work directly in the
fields of ethics and moral philosophy. This will be done by going to some
new books or reprints of older ones that have appeared in the last few
years.22
21. "[Wlhen we put aside extravagant claims, it must still be recognized that though
the course of moral development is neither unilinear nor indefinite, there has been,
there is, moral progress . .. assuming that Socrates' moral insight is superior to that
of any living person, it does not follow that there has been no moral progress since his
time." Id. at 79. "Indeed, it may be fairly asked not only whether there has been
any substantive progress in morals since the time of Socrates but also whether there
has been any development in the understanding and method of ethics. Whatever the
answer to the first query, that to the second is likely to be discouraging; the history
of ethics often looks like a set of proposals arranged in time without other direction."
FLOWER, SOME PRESENT-DAY DISAGREEMENTS IN MoRAl PmIosoPHY IN ASPECTS OF
VALUE 19, 33 (Gruber ed. 1959). "Seen from the mid-twentieth century, the record
of human conduct in the West does not seem to be one of clear general moral improve-
ment of progress, not a record of unilinear evolution upward." BRINTON, A HISTORY OF
WVEsTERN MoRALs 421 (1959). The argument whether or not the history of mankind
reveals moral progress is hardly capable of resolution without strict definition and
limitation. No such effort will be made here. The usual proof in favor of progress is
made by pointing to the humanitarian efforts of the nineteenth century. Other better
known acts of the last twenty-five years are usually left unmentioned. Hitler's ovens
and Stalin's slave camps are obvious examples.
22. AN EXAMINATION OF THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETmcs. By Stephen Edelston
Toulmin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Pp. xiv, 228. $4.50.
THE FurNcnoNs OF MORAL Pnmosopsy. By Harold Ofstad. New York: The Humani-
ties Press (no date). Pp. 45. $1.25.




It is a premise of this essay that the law is going some place. A law
which is fixed once and for all would not have the problem of choosing
among conflicting values. The judge would only have to discover what
the law was, or find it, and then state it. But the obvious existence of ap-
parently equally balanced choices cries out for a test by which to make the
choice. Call it what you will, we need a standard, end, ideal, or purpose.
Fulfilling this need presents many problems that have plagued men for
centuries. We can in a brief space neither trace the history of these issues
nor examine them in very close fashion. Even if we could, such is not our
main interest here. Rather, the purpose of this essay is to point out an area
of learning that has a very significant bearing on legal philosophy. To
show the relation of the two fields of learning there have been selected
for extended discussion three issues important in ethics to show how
thinkers talk in this field. Out of the many subjects that could have been
chosen, the three most useful for our purposes seem to be intuitionism, the
emotive theory of ethics, and the interrelations between the "is" and the
"ought." A further basis for selection was that these particular issues dem-
onstrate that these areas of learning are not separable. One cannot study
just jurisprudence, or just ethics, or just metaphysics. These are all some-
how linked together in the individual's understanding of the nature of
reality and of how society works. In our consideration of intuitionism we
shall see at once that we have to face the problem of how we know and
what we know. In discussing the emotive theory of ethics, the problem is
the extent to which our language and the words we use reflect both our
thought processes and external reality. Finally, our investigation of the
relation between ethics and actual conduct will indicate not only the diffi-
culty but the widespread disagreement over some of our most basic con-
ceptions.
Before going directly to these substantive problems of modem ethics,
some limitations on this present essay should be set forth. For example,
since the ethical theories to be closely examined are some of those widely
SECOND THouGHTs iN MoRAL PHmosoP Hy. By A. C. Ewing. New York: The Mac-
millan Co., 1959. Pp. vii, 190. $4.50.
ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEAlS. By Felix S. Cohen. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 303. $1.95.
I uNcn'IA EThICA. By G. E. Moore. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.
Pp. xxvii, 232. $1.95.
ETmcs AND LANGUAGE. By Charles L. Stevenson. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 190. Pp. xi, 338. $1.75.
TmEE TRADITIONS OF MoRAL THoUrHT. By Dorothea Krook. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1959. Pp. xiii, 355. $5.50.
ETmCAL NATURmM AND THE MODERN WoLDn-ViEw. By E. M. Adams. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. Pp. xii, 229. $6.00.
MEN AND MoRALs: THE STORY OF Ermcs. By Woodbridge Riley. New York: Fred-
erick Ungar Publishing Co., 1960. Pp. viii, 425. $6.50 (cloth), $1.95 (paper).
PR NCIrPES OF MORAL Pimosoprrv. By Ben Kimpel. New York: Philosophical Library,
1960. Pp. xi, 234. $3.75.
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discussed in England and America from the time of G. E. Moore, no pur-
pose would be served by going back further because our primary interest
is the impact of modem ethics upon modem jurisprudence. But past is
prologue and the student should not, indeed cannot, ignore the historical
development of ethics.P
If we are not going to review the history of ethics, neither are we going
to discuss virtue, its content, or its various forms. A review of older books
in ethics, starting with Aristotle, demonstrates that a common method of
writing was to describe the good man in all his moral parts. Such books
are, in effect, technical manuals giving advice on how to be a virtuous man.
It is now considered old-fashioned to discuss ethics in such a manner and
the usual book of this type met with today is exhortatory. But it is not
necessarily so, and as proof that this approach can indeed be sophisticated,
the reader is urged to examine Dorothea Krook's Three Traditions of Moral
Thought.
Mrs. Krook has elected to evaluate ethical philosophers in terms of
their attitudes towards love. The highest form of love is that exemplified
by Christ who, in giving His life, redeemed men and delivered them from
the consequences of the sin of Adam and Eve. This exhibition of the re-
demptive power of love is the central theme of the work. The recognition
of this power is offered as the test of the great moral philosopher. The
more coldblooded thinkers whose ideals are earthbound and who have some
antipathy to the passions show their limitations and downgrade themselves
by failing to exalt this power of love. Such is Mrs. Krook's rating of the
moral philosophy of Aristotle and Hobbes.
Even if we were to admit that the transforming power of love is an
inherent attribute of man's moral nature, we would still have to question
what kind of love the author has in mind. She is quite dissatisfied with
Aristotle's Magnanimous Man with his serene pleasantness to all. Such a
man never goes beyond himself. Calmness of person and surroundings is
almost an ultimate end for Aristotle. But the higher view of human nature
exalts the disinterested love of our fellow men and "disinterested pity,
disinterested passion for knowledge."24 The key words constantly used
are "disinterested" and "selfless." Such attributes when attached to action
bring men to the higher reaches of morality. It is not clear why this should
be so. The author merely asserts that this is the tradition. This ordering
of ethical systems depends upon the author's pinpointing of the "single ulti-
mate end of human endeavor" which she does in these terms:
We might say, with the mystical Christian and Platonist, that the Supreme Good
is the loss of self in the soul's union with God; or, with the less mystical Christian,
23. A fine introduction to the history of ethics is RILEY, Mmr ANM MoRaLs (1960)
(first published in 1929). The book covers various ethical writers and movements
through the end of the nineteenth century.
24. Khoox, THREE TRADrTIONS OF MORAL THOUGHT 121 (1959).
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that it is the imitation of Christ in perfect love and service of our fellow-men; or,
with the Humanist, that it is the love and service of our fellow-men without
reference to the greater glory of God.m
The main objection to the book is that its central theme is assumed.26 As
we shall see, modem ethics is almost completely wrapped up in problems
that do not seem to exist for Mrs. Krook. An unexpected feature of the
book is her selection of writers and works for serious discussion. Matthew
Arnold and D. H. Lawrence are featured; Immanuel Kant is mentioned
only once; and G. E. Moore, twice. The reason for this curious selection
is that the book grew out of lectures to literature, and not philosophy, stu-
dents. Hence, T. S. Eliot becomes a prominent critic in ethical philosophy.
This is an old-fashioned book and yet it will never be completely out of
style despite the appearances of the last fifty years.
One further preliminary in this essay relates to the definition of terms.
Definition is a lasting problem in this field because frequently there is no
care taken about it. Since it will be given some extended consideration
later, what is now offered is hardly to be accepted as final, but, instead,
will provide a starting point for making some kind of distinction among
various ethical terms in common use.
In view of the exposition of the issues faced by Justice Cardozo, it should
be clear that a legal philosopher needs some sort of theory to tell him what
values the jurist should seek to effect by law. In such a theory, it is likely
that justice and goodness would be among the values that ought to be
sought along with consistency within the legal system and stability within
the political system. But a value theory is not necessarily an ethical theory.
There are all sorts of values, such as truth and beauty, which are not asso-
ciated with human conduct. The general study of values is called axiology.
Ethics is but a part of this larger study. Ethics and morality are concerned
with the specific problems of acting rightly, of doing what one ought to
do, of doing the good, or, most generally, of acting morally. Morality is the
general consideration of right conduct. Ethics is devoted primarily to the
principles behind moral conduct.
Since axiology and ethics are closely related, ethics asks about the most
desirable conduct possible upon the basis of standards worked out by a
value theory seeking to determine all of our ends. We shall have to
devote some space to indicating the questions that are usually asked in
these areas of scholarship. There is much overlapping and very little clarity
at the borders. In the opening sentence of his preface to Principia Ethica
Moore states that the disagreements in ethics can be attributed to "a very
simple cause; namely to the attempt to answer questions, without first
25. Id. at 120. Compare generally with D'Ancy, TnE MIND AND HEA"T OF LovL
(1956); Lxwis, Tim FoiR LovEs (1960).




discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to answer."2 7
The first issue to be clarified is the difference between morals and ethics.
This is necessary so that even if a book is entitled Men and Morals, we may
know that it actually deals with ethics.2 Professor Adams makes the dis-
tinction by contrasting "the use of moral language in a practical situation
... and its use in a somewhat detached; academic atmosphere to appraise
particular actions . . . or general kinds of doings."2 9 The former use is
morality and the latter is ethics.
In one sense we can compare morals and ethics with engineering and
science. The contrast is between action and thought. There is a clearly
defined area of scholarship known as the philosophy of science to which
ethical philosophy would appear to be the analogue. The distinction be-
tween moral philosophy and ethical philosophy, "to the extent that the
two can be distinguished," Professor Adams adds,30 must be one of the
relative emphasis upon conduct or theory. The moral philosopher would
be the wise man who understands human actions. The ethical philosopher
may be a thinker with a far different objective. This objective is not agreed
upon by all writers. For instance, Professor Adams believes that "the ulti-
mate objective of philosophical analysis of moral discourse is to disclose its
ontological significance."3'1
If we make ethics consider, in a theoretical fashion, the general problems
of conduct, we arrive at varying degrees of abstraction. The discussion of
the logical characteristics of ethical language is more than ethics and, in
truth, may be called "meta-ethics."32 The metaphysical characteristics of
ethical theories has been grouped under the name of "ethical ontology." The
lines dividing these areas are not always clear. Suffice it to know that the
areas have been marked out.
We can agree that the "science of morality" or "moral philosophy"
refers to "the set of propositions involving the concepts good, bad, worse
... in so far as they are applied to man's voluntary activity."3 3 The term
"ethics," properly used, would include all such propositions whether or not
they refer to voluntary human activity and would include such propositions
when they refer to nonhuman entities and to human experiences which do
not involve the will. In this sense, morality must have a definite reference
27. MooRE, PmNcinrA ETmCA at vii (1959).
28. This particular book is subtitled The Story of Ethics, which suggests that at
least for one author there appears to be no difference. See note 23 supra.
29. ADAMs, ETHICAL NATuRALISM AND THE MoDRN Won.LD-Vraw 5 (1960).
30. Id. at 9.
31. Ibid.
32. "The language and argumentation of ethical discourse." OrSTAD, ThE FUNCTIONS
or MoRAL PHmosoPHy 17. "[Aln enquiry into the logic and language of ethical terms
is purely a linguistic enquiry .... ." BowvEs, Tim CONCEPT OF MoRAnMXY 17 (1959).
"[A] moral philosopher, whose concern is not primarily to make moral judgements but
to analyze their nature." Ayer, Foreword to NowiL-Smrra, ETmCs (1954).
33. COHEN, ETHICAL SysTrms AND LwAL IDE,s 128 (1959).
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to human conduct and yet it is also clear what is meant when Professor
Moore says that "it is not the business of the ethical philosopher to give
personal advice or exhortation." 34 Ethics then is the theoretical study of
the general principles of what ought to be done. Moore approaches the
problem of proper conduct by asking what is good since our objective
should be the maximization of the good. Ewing, however, emphasizes duty.
He says that our duty will be the good. He isn't sure that if we first found
the good we would be bound to do it. These issues will be enlarged upon
as we proceed.
Following this consideration of the use of some of the more basic ex-
pressions used in this field, a glimpse may now be had of the problems that
are or could be discussed within the area of scholarship known as moral
philosophy. The pamphlet 5 by Mr. Ofstad of the University of Stockholm
performs this task. It is first pointed out that for the classical thinkers,
the basic question assumed the uncomplicated form of "How shall we live
in order to realize the good life?" The answer to such a question need
not be purely descriptive; analysis is permissible. A question in this form
draws for answers on whatever learning is available. One line of modem
thinking has been to narrow the questions to be considered. For fifty years
now the Anglo-American moral philosophers have stressed, as the primary
problem in this field, the analysis of ethical language.
As must be apparent to even laymen entering this field, the analysis of
ethical language is but a small part of the whole field of moral philosophy.
It is just as important that extensive study be made of nonverbal ethical be-
havior as of the language of ethical discourse. This first task introduces
into ethics the scholarship of other sciences, such as sociology and anthro-
pology. The value of this pamphlet lies primarily in the fact that the
author has refused to limit the scope of ethics to the narrow confines al-
lowed by so many writers today. It will be argued in this essay that ethics
is not self-sufficient. It starts from principles not produced by ethics and
ends with factual consequences observable by anyone. Language can only
help us clarify and understand.
Let us now turn to G. E. Moore, the first of the men who are generally
regarded as modem ethical philosophers. We will look briefly at the man
and then at the controversies he set going.
III. G. E. MooRE
There are thinkers who in the course of their lifetime of work constantly
34. MOORE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 3. "Philosophers after Moore . . . took it that
the central question of ethics was the question 'What does "good" mean?'-but they
refrained from answering the question 'What things are good?' and made it clear that
this was a matter for the moralist, and not for the philosopher." MUnDocH, META-
PHYsics AND ETmics iNr I NATURE OF MurapHsics 99, 101 (Pears ed. 1957).
35. OFSTAD, THE F NcTIONS or MORAL PimosoPHY.
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change their position as they reconsider the same topics. The two prime
examples of this practice in modern philosophy have been G. E. Moore and
Bertrand Russell. In Russell's intellectual autobiography, one can read
sentences saying: "I now regard the opinions set forth in that book as
utter nonsense."36 These dazzling shifts are, of course, part of the fun of
studying Russell.
Moore's very methods of work entailed a continuing re-examination of
the problems themselves with apparently no consideration for his previously
expressed opinions. For the purposes of the present essay, Moore's views
as set forth in the Principia, first published in 1903, will be the sole refer-
ence. Moore himself later expressed a preference for his Ethics3 7 which he
says is "much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments
than the Principia."38
In his autobiography, Moore described his way of looking at philosophy.
He was stimulated by two problems, "first, the problem of trying to get
really as to what on earth a given philosopher meant by something which
he said, and, secondly, the problem of discovering what really satisfactory
reasons there are for supposing that what he meant was true, or, alterna-
tively, was false."39
Moore also described how he prepared his lectures in philosophy at
Cambridge. For twenty-eight years, he prepared his lectures, as he says,
"from hand to mouth." He prepared each lecture as it came due without
any reference to how he had handled similar problems in previous lectures.
He explains this method in this fashion: "I did this chiefly because I was
always each year dissatisfied with what I had said on any given point the
year before, and wanted to think more about it and improve my treat-
ment ....- 40
In view of these characteristics, there will be no attempt made to de-
scribe the complete ethical system of Professor Moore. Rather we will
consider only what the Principia Ethica has meant to modern students of
ethical philosophy and how they believe, in that book, he analyzed the
nature of ethical terms and concepts. Moore's book is a landmark in
modem ethics and every student in the field must be familiar with it.
Moore addressed himself to answering three questions: (1) What is the
nature of the predicate peculiar to ethics? (2) What kinds of things them-
selves possess this predicate? (3) What ought we to do? Moore did his
work in the simplest kind of language, writing as though he was just using
common sense. He argued as though the right result would be obvious if
36. RussEL, My PmLosopmcAL DEVELOPMENT pasim (1959).
37. MoorE, ETmcs (1912).
38. Moor,, An Autobiography, in THE PnmosoPHy OF G. E. MooRE 27 (Schilpp
ed. 1942).
39. Id. at 14.
40. Id. at 31.
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only one could show the absurdity of all the wrong paths that he discovered
-could be followed.
What is this predicate that is peculiar to ethics? It is the good and "the
good" is "that which is good." "Good" itself is indefinable; it is "a simple,
indefinable, unanalyzable object of thought"41 or notion which is the basic
conception in ethics. Moore admits this is disappointing but, nevertheless,
important.42 And then, as he says, to show how important this conclusion is,
he asserts "that propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and
never analytic. ... 43
Professor Stevenson calls this maxim the "central contention of Moore's
ethics."44 The problem is that if we take a proposition such as "Pleasure
is good" we have to say, not only are the two terms equivalent but that they
are identical, because by definition good is simple and unanalyzable. Equat-
ing good, therefore, with a particular natural term leads to contradictions.
Since there are many such terms which qualify as good, none can be ex-
cluded, and none can be good to the exclusion of any other. If propositions
about good turn out in fact to be only analytic, it becomes impossible both
to define good and to make a significant statement about good. But it is
also argued by such as Adams and Cohen that to make a synthetic proposi-
tion about good, the term cannot be simple. This inconsistency is now
known as the naturalistic fallacy. There must be a difference between
"pleasure" and "good," but if good is simple, indefinable, and unanalyzable,
then it has no properties or parts and simply naming alleged properties
does not add to our knowledge of good. We cannot analyze or explain
good.
Moore's analysis of this point has difficulties. 45 He gives every sign of
fighting the problem and it doesn't come through convincingly. Subsequent
writers all discuss the fallacy and it has had a mixed reception. Professor
Adams accepts the results but appears to doubt that it represents a logical
fallacy. Felix Cohen argues that Moore doesn't prove his case:
Moore has shown no reason why an adequate definition of good is impossible,
why, that is, good should be simple and unanalyzable. If good can be defined (in
41. MOORE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 21.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 7. These are Kantian terms that have become common currency. KANT,
CRTQuE OF PUtE REASON (N. K. Smith transl. 1950). "[A] proposition is analytic
when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains, and
synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience." AYER, LANGUAGEI,
TRUTH AN LoGic 78 (2d ed. 1948).
44. STrLvENsoN, ETrncs AND LANGUAGE 271 (1960). "[T]he more critical issue is
whether ethical statements can qualify as empirical or synthetic ones and it is about
this problem that current controversy has raged. The emotivists say 'no'." FLowEn,
Some Present-Day Disagreements in Moral Philosophy, in AsPEcTs OF VALUE 29
(1959).
45. ADAs, op. cit. supra note 29, at 41. "Moore's own statements about the matter
are woefully confused and confusing .. ." Id. at 48.
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natural terms) then to ask whether the definiens of such a definition is good is
simply to question the truth of a tautology. If good means "ministering to
pleasure" then to ask whether what ministers to pleasure is good is not a significant
question.46
The issue is vital because almost the first disagreement that is met with
in ethics is over the possibility of defining the good in purely psychological
or biological terms. Cohen says that "it may be the case that good is con-
venient mental shorthand for some complex natural terms."47 The issue is
not whether or not ethical concepts are objective but whether they are
scientifically verifiable. The naturalists assert "that ethical characteristics
can be analyzed without remainder into non-ethical ones."48 Or, as Dr.
Ewing would have it, the term means "that all ethical judgments are com-
pletely analyzable as assertions of factual propositions falling within one
subject-matter of a natural science....-49
Even though Mrs. Bowes can find little assistance from Moore's analysis
of the ethical "good," she nevertheless asserts that "Moore's criticism of
naturalism has indeed been of great service to Ethics as he believed it
would be, for it brings home to us afresh the important fact that the dis-
tinctive nature of morality cannot be realized merely in terms of non-value
facts."50
So we find that Moore's initial contribution was ontological rather than
ethical. He left his mark on the problem of the nature of ethical terms.
Because he undermined one theory, the weight of recent ethical theory has
tended to be nonnaturalistic. There are strong pockets of naturalism left.51
Felix Cohen, for example, was a naturalist in ethics. A debating topic could
be whether John Dewey was a naturalist.52 But the remaining writers find
something unique in ethical terms and ethical discourse and it is from this
unique characteristic and what it means, or contains, or how we can know
it that the arguments arise. These arguments will be alluded to in the
course of this discussion.
Moore's work on naturalism did not settle all the problems. Even after
all this work we cannot certainly designate who is a naturalist. For example,
for Professor Adams, Toulmin is a logical naturalist. He feels that Toulmin
maintains that
the conclusion that A is the thing to do in such and such a situation is a valid
46. ConEN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 163.
47. Id. at 164.
48. BRoAD, FivE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 257 (1951).
49. EwiNG, SECOND THOUGHTS xN MORAL PamosoPirr 1 (1959). See also ADAMS,
op. cit. supra note 29, at 14.
50. BowEs, op. cit. supra note 32, at 132.
51. See NATURALiSM AND n HumAN Spmrr (Krikorian ed. 1944).
52. Adams says Yes. ADAMS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 58. Stevenson claims him for




"ethical inference" from certain factual statements but that we need not look
beyond the factual statements which "ethically entail" the moral conclusion in
order to discover the ontological significance of the whole argument. A generaliza-
tion of this would be a naturalistic thesis that ethical judgments and ethical
arguments have no ontological significance other than that of their factual
premises.5 3
On the contrary, Ewing maintains that Toulmin's view is "the antithesis
of naturalism."4 He continues: "[O]n this view ethics has a quite unique
character, a quite distinct logic of its own. It expresses a unique attitude
... and it has its own criteria not justifiable in terms of anything else."55
The opposition between these two views is complete and clearly more
is involved than ethics. The issue is one of ontology or the nature of being.
The questions thus raised go beyond the limits of this essay.
As has been noted, Moore's work undermined naturalistic ethics. But it
should be added that he did not replace the empty place with anything of
his own to guide conduct or to develop a nonnatural objective theory of
ethics.56 Ewing, for example, says: "Unfortunately most philosophers,
including myself, are either clear that they have no idea of an indefinable
goodness, or at least not at all clear whether they have one or not."
7
Santayana found the idea of good existing without a particular referent like
finding whiskey intoxicating as it stands "dead drunk in the bottle." 8
Santayana's argument was in opposition to "hypostatic ethics" in which
good is given an objective existence without any connection with specific
desires and interests.59
If naturalistic ethics are now suspect, the possibilities of nonnaturalistic
ethics ought to be canvassed. Since the shortcomings of a subjective ethics
are obvious, the search is for an objective system. Ewing's book, for ex-
ample, is primarily devoted to an inquiry into nonnaturalistic ethical values.
Implicit in most of the discussion to follow will be the query as to the
possibility of any kind of objective ethics. If "objective" requires inde-
pendent existence does this imply that the values must exist prior to their
53. ADAMS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 102.
54. EwiNG, op. cit. supra note 49, at 35.
55. Ibid.
56. See HAnROD, Tim LiE oF JoHN MAiNAnD KEYNES 75, 214 (1951); KEYNES, Two
MEmoms 78 (1949).
57. EwwnG, op. cit. supra note 49, at 82.
58. SANTAYANA, Wnms oF Docmnm 146 (1913). Santayana's argument had the
interesting effect of converting Bertrand Russell. RussEL, PFmosorny 230 (1927);
CoHr, op. cit. supra note 33, at 159 n.28.
59. "Like aesthetic values, no ethical ones can exist as objective entities independent
of human beings, unless some suprahuman mind exists and has established them. If
the reality of divine forces cannot be proved with purely scientific means, neither can
the independent objective existence of ethical values be so proved....
"We only fool ourselves when we speak of ethical values as 'being there,' independ-
ent of men, while expressing or admitting doubt about divine forces." BREcn, PoLm-
cAL THEoR 290-91 (1959).
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application? This will pose a problem if we derive our values from the
consequences of human acts. There are many facets to this issue, many of
which will be noted in the course of this essay, but some of them are
far-ranging. In particular, Professor Adams looks searchingly into the
metaphysical qualities of such entities.
Adams' book, as he himself notes, is far too short to develop all the issues
raised. His destruction of various forms of naturalism is quickly followed
by a conclusion that values are a part of reality--'value-requiredness is a
unique categorial feature of reality."60 We shall not look into the character
of this value-requiredness. If this quality inheres in the individual seg-
ments of "what there is in the world,"61 we have something different from
independent and separable existences known as nonnatural ethical prop-
erties. The differences are apparent in describing reality, in determining
what and how we can know, and, of course, in the consequences for
ethics. Although the upper reaches of metaphysics are being avoided here,
there are some points that have to be considered.
For example, are ethical terms facts? The answer must be that they are
not empirically verifiable facts but, as Mrs. Bowes says, we need not so
limit the meaning of the word "fact." She says that "a fact is such that we
find it somehow demands acceptance and there is nothing which calls for
its rejection."62 The requirements for such a "fact" are "that it is possible
for us to conceive of it and such a conception is somehow necessitated by
the nature of our experience." This is too easy. To adequately demonstrate
that ethical terms are facts, the explanation must be along the lines that
Professor Adams suggests. Lon Fuller attempts to merge fact and value
but, it seems to me, without success. The failure to communicate between
Nagel and Fuller shows that a difficult problem is at issue.P This contro-
versy is likely to continue and will be alluded to further in this essay.
If it be accepted that ethical terms are not reducible to natural terms,
what shall we say about their being reduced to nonnatural or nonempirical
terms? This has meaning only if we return to the issue just considered and
inquire about the possibility of a nonnatural objective value. This is not
the place to develop the nature of existence that is involved in such a
claim. The problem is the nature of reality and Ewing argues that he will
not assume "that the only reality is that discoverable by natural science."64
But this feeling does not get him too far because he soon comments on "the
-oddness and elusiveness of the 'non-natural' properties . ... "65 He is
reduced to pointing out that "non-natural on non-empirical concepts like
60. AD.Ms, op. cit. supra note 29, at ix, 202.
61. Id. at 15.
62. BowEs, op. cit. supra note 32, at 54.
63. See note 13 supra.
64. EwiNG, op. cit. supra note 49, at 38.
65. Id. at 51. He had previously called them "mysterious." Id. at 35.
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those of logic are granted existence even by naturalists. Why then can we
not admit non-natural ethical terms?"6
Mrs. Bowes gets away from this mildly exhortatory approach. She has a
variety of reasons for believing that ethical terms are objective facts. An
ethical principle has the same relation to the experience of ethically
oriented humans as a principle of physics has to the facts of that field. They
both explain the nature of existence. There is no problem in calling a
principle of physics a fact and she, therefore, feels there should be none
with respect to moral principles. Mrs. Bowes feels no necessity to posit
"a world of non-natural characteristics." As previously noted, she is satisfied
that a fact exists when it somehow demands acceptance and there is no
good reason for rejecting it.
These issues, however interesting and instructive on what ethical philoso-
phers talk about, will not advance our own themes and will not be pursued.
One point that does arise in this type of discussion is the use of the word
"true" with respect to ethical judgments. Obviously when used with respect
to a natural fact, we mean that there is a discoverable correspondence of
one fact with other facts. But the discovery of such a correspondence is
not usually regarded as a primary purpose of ethical judgments. Ewing,
for example, rejects any contention that "ethical propositions could be
reduced to merely factual ones or deduced formally from the latter."67 He
concludes that truth in ethical judgments is a seeking for a correspondence
"in a very wide sense" to reality which will demonstrate that the ethical
judgment was justified by the factual situation. This justification by facts
is truth in ethics. One alternative to this view is, as we shall see, that
ethical judgments are not facts at all but are mere expressions of emotion.
Let us now turn to the three ethical problems which, as previously
mentioned, have been selected for expanded treatment. Their full signifi-
cance may appear only after our task is finished. But in any sweep of
the field intuitionism, emotivism, and the relation of fact and norm would
have to be considered. Accordingly, even though many other topics are
omitted, it is hoped that the discussion of these three will give some of the
flavor of modem ethical discussion and some insight into how the profes-
sionals in the field talk.
A. Intuitionism
If there is one point in which no modem ethical theorist seems to believe,
it is that, as Jerome Hall suggests, one intuits the good or the right thing
to do "like a flash."68 The nature of intuition is an interesting problem into
which we cannot delve too deeply because the full statement would entail
several theories of knowledge which cannot be unraveled here. All that will
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id. at 48.
68. See note 16 supra.
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be attempted will be a study of the general understanding of the term.
"The term intuitionism is ordinarily applied to a theory according to
which conduct is held to be right when conformed to certain precepts or
principles of Duty, intuitively known to be unconditionally binding!"69
Note that the intuition is that the conduct is right but that no hint is given
as to what goodness is. G. E. Moore is frequently referred to as an
intuitionist, 70 but in the preface to the Frincipia, Moore begs that it be
noted that he is not an intuitionist "in the ordinary sense of the term."
71
Moore argues that there are two questions that moral philosophers have
failed to distinguish in much of their discussion. They are: What is good
in itself? and, What kind of actions ought we perform? Moore claims that
there is no relevant evidence that will assist in answering the first question.
The answer to the second question, on the other hand, is entirely capable
of proof. Thus, as Moore says:
The Intuitionist proper is distinguished by maintaining that propositions of my
second class-propositions which assert that a certain action is right or a duty-are
incapable of proof or disproof by any inquiry into the results of such actions. I, on
the contrary, am no less anxious to maintain that propositions of this kind are not
"Intuitions," than to maintain that propositions of my first class are Intuitions.72
Properly used, therefore, the term means that the proper course of acting
in the face of a given situation is somehow immediately made known to
us. 73 There are several criticisms of this method of learning or knowing
our duties that merit discussion. For example, what kind of knowledge
could this be? Can it really be true that the ethical quality of an act is.
fixed before we know the consequences of the act in practice? Further, as
a moral test, there are serious practical objections to moral knowledge by
intuition.
The intuitionist appears to be saying that he knows his duty because he
finds it in his heart or head. Accordingly, Toulmin classifies intuitionists
among those who regard goodness as an objective property. And he dis-
poses of them in the course of his analysis of the nature of goodness as a
directly perceived property.74 By a series of examples he points out that
69. CALIONS, THE GOOD MAN AND TrE GOOD 177 (1923). The interior quotation
is from SIwDwcK, ThE METHODs OF Emcs 3 (5th ed. 1893).
70. 1 STAPLETON, Parr3osops-y AND LIVING 184 (1939); NorTroP, THE CoM-
PIE xrn' OF LEGAL AND ETcAL EXPERmNCE 52, 68 (1959); BPEcrrr, PoLrncAL.
THEony 534 (1959); ADAPTs, op. cit. supra note 29, at 44.
71. MooRE, op. cit. supra note 27, at x.
72. Ibid. Moore adds with respect to his intuitions that he means "merely to assert
that they are incapable of proof." He implies "nothing whatever as to the manner or
origin of our cognition of them."
73. "The word 'directly' or 'immediately' may also suggest that a process of intui-
tion happens in a flash or that all of a sudden we become aware of things we did not
know before. I am not using the words in this way, although it is not impossible for
some knowledge to occur in a flash." BowEs, op. cit. supra note 34, at 70.
74. TouLMm, AN EXAMNATON OF THE PLACE OF REtsoN IN ETmcs 18 (1958).
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goodness itself cannot be described and that a criterion of goodness, like
paying one's debts, does not have the close relationship that, for instance
"equality of sides" has to the quality of "squareness." Toulmin concludes
his statement of the difficulties of objectively analyzing goodness by saying:
"If we take it that a simple (unanalyzable) quality is meant, the apparent
arbitrariness of an ostensive definition is puzzling; if a complex (analyza-
ble) quality is understood, no definite routine for confirming its presence
is fordhcoming." 75
A theory of knowledge is possible which admits that one can know by
intuition.76 But none of the writers we are here discussing would adhere
to it without very substantial qualification. It is of interest, however, to
note that the example most frequently used to demonstrate the power of
intuitionism is precisely the example used by theorists to exhtibit the
fallacies inherent in the claims of the intuitionists. We are told that we
intuit the right thing to do just as we intuit that this paper is white. There
is supposed to be no going behind these intuitions which are basic, un-
provable, and self-evident. If our knowledge of right conduct is the same
as our knowledge of the physical world we must be equating our knowl-
edge of the attributes of the physical world with our knowledge of the
facts of a postulated moral world. There is a significant difference between
these two worlds, however, and it lies in our ability to test the data of the
physical world and our inability to do likewise with moral facts. If we
meet a color-blind man we are not forced to accept his insistence that red
is green. There are laboratory methods by which objectively to distinguish
red from green. But how different is our experience when we meet a
morally blind man! The difference, of course, is that there are no tests to
give objective results to moral intuitions."7
A most important objection to intuitionism is that it determines ethical
values without regard to the consequences of actions. Felix Cohen reacts
in typical fashion:
Intuitive or commonsense ethics recognizes no dependence upon positive science.
The immediate reaction of conscience to a particular situation demands no intellect-
ual concatenation of the situation judged with other situations. Indeed it seems
probably that adhesion to an ethics of conscience, which we have seen to be
rather fashionable among jurists, is responsible for the legal tradition which
regards investigation of the actual effects of legal decisions and statutes as trivial
and useless.
78
Before we get too enmeshed in controversy, let us recognize that we are
75. Id. at 19. An ostensive definition is made by giving examples or by pointing.
76. See DuNcAN-JoNEs, Bu mrr's MoRAL PiuLosoPaY passim (1952).
77. See NowELL-Smrm, ETmics 48 (1954).
78. CottN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 46-47. "Modem ethics recognizes that insofar
as we pass moral judgments on acts without knowledge of their consequences we
literally do not know what we are talking about." THE LEGAL CONSCiENCE, SELECTED
PAPERS OF Fxuxx S. COHEN 399-400 (Cohen ed. 1960).
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faced with two traditions in ethics of which one, the deontological, has
dimmed in our times. Some definitions may clarify the point.
A deontological ethics or intuitionist ethics arises from a belief that
"conduct is held to be right when conformed to certain precepts or prin-
ciples of Duty, intuitively known to be binding." 9
Such a theory could not consider weighing acts to see which would
produce the most happiness or the greatest balance of intrinsic value. These
considerations require a utilitarian or teleological ethics which takes value
or good as the basic idea. John Dewey calls this a theory of the good as
contrasted with a jural theory of ethics in which Duty or Right is the
fundamental idea. Dewey adds:
At some point, of course, each theory has to deal with the factor emphasized by
its rival. If we start with Law as central, good resides in these acts which conform
to its obligations. The good is obedience to law, submission to its moral authority.
If we start from the Good, laws, rules, are concerned with the means of defining
or achieving it.80
In view of these definitions which, be it noted, relate to the rightness of
conduct, it is easy to demonstrate that C. E. Moore is not an intuitionist in
the ordinary sense of the term. In the Principia where he discusses ethics
in relation to conduct, he defines "duty" as "that action which will cause
more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative."81 He
means just what he says and in order to arrive at our duty we must possess
sufficient knowledge to foresee all the possible consequences on the
Universe of all the possible alternative courses of action. He readily agrees
that we cannot have such knowledge and without regret concludes:
"Accordingly it follows that we never have any reason to suppose that an
action is our duty: we can never be sure that any action will produce the
greatest value possible."82
Hence, for Moore, not only are consequences of action of the utmost
importance in knowing our duty but so great is the burden of knowing all
the consequences that, in the end, we cannot even know our duty. Moore
seems to have something on his side when he insists that he is not a con-
ventional intuitionist. This position ultimately lost Moore many adherents
because of its obvious lack of utility.
Turning finally to the practical objections to deciding action on the basis
79. CAxxNs, TAE GOOD MAN AND T=E GOOD 177 (1923). 'Trimitive ethics is 'deon-
tological,' a matter of rigid duties, taboos, customs and commandments." TouxmI-,
op. cit. supra note 74, at 137.
80. DmwEY & TurFs, Enmcs 224-25 (1908); Now-EmL-SMrr, ETmcs 133 (1954).
"Pound's theory of social interests is thus a teleological type of axiology, like that of
Bentham and Ihering; it corresponds to the type of ethical theory known as the
theory of the good." PATTERSON, Pound's Theory of Social Interests, in INTm-
PEETATIONS OF MODERN LEcAL PnmosoprEs 558, 561 (1947).
81. MooRE, Panmcrp ETmcA 148 (1959).
82. Id. at 149.
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of intuition, there are two such objections that merit consideration. First,
it is an obvious fact of life that we are frequently faced with apparently
equally balanced choices of action-and at that time intuitionism doesn't
help. The basis for making a selection lies elsewhere and a suspicion arises
that if the difficult cases are not settled by intuitionism, we should not need
it only for the easy choices.
The second, and even more important, practical objection is that different
people have different intuitions. It will not do to say that all people intuit
that murder is wrong. The fact is that they intuit differently what murder
is and what justifies the killing of one man by another.
The suggestion that there are other techniques for resolving moral prob-
lems will not now be followed up, but will be suggested in the course of
seeing what some of our other authors think about intuitionism. We have
already noted the opinions of Moore, Cohen, and Toulmin. Let us now
turn to Mrs. Bowes and Dr. Ewing.
Mrs. Bowes begins her book by discussing whether there can be objective
moral facts. Having decided that there can be, she then turns to consider
how we can know such facts.83 She answers this question by stating that,
while she does not like to call herself an intuitionist, she does believe that
certain moral facts can be known intuitively if that word is understood in a
certain way. The certain way, of course, is the key. Intuitive knowledge
is immediate knowledge and is to be distinguished from inferential or
mediate knowledge. By this is meant that intuited facts are accepted for
themselves and not because they entail knowledge of other facts which we
already know. We can thus see how close is the verbal analogy between
knowledge of moral facts and of sense perceptions. Actually, however,
there is nothing in moral knowledge that precisely corresponds to our
knowledge of, say, colors.
While intuited knowledge is direct and unlearnt, it arises out of the
total background of experience and not through the function of some sense
organ. In this sense, intuition is possible "through a gradually widening
feld of experience and a slow seasoning of our personality to it . . .
Following such a process we can have a series of intuitions at various stages
of our experience and they may, of course, be quite different from one
another. There may also be different people with different back-
grounds. They will intuit differently. Mrs. Bowes insists that our intuitions
at various stages will not be inferences nor based on a process of inference.
This appears to limit inference to meaning some process of conscious
deduction. Mrs. Bowes has intuition include elements of inference and
perception but insists that the final product is a single quality, a reflective
summation of all the elements.
83. BowEs, THE CoNcEPT or MoRA=L 66 (1959).
84. Id. at 70.
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Using this definition, Mrs. Bowes then examines the problem of the
mistaken intuition. This, for her, is, of course, no problem. A mistaken
intuition is like any other unwarranted conclusion and there is no formula
to use or criterion to apply to distinguish a right intuition from a wrong
-one. The intensity of the certainty with which one feels an intuition is no
test of its rightness.
Ewing has an excellent analysis of the various uses of the term "intuition."
-ie notes that it is no explanation of ethical knowledge to say that one has
.an intuition to do a particular act. Such a remark is rather intended to
.argue that no explanation is needed. But, such an argument is not per-
missible with every type of knowledge and the issue is just what kind of
knowledge is capable of being directly cognizable, that is, known without
-deliberately pursuing a logical process or remembering. The knowledge
that is directly cognized is not without a background. As Ewing says, "the
man who knows much of his subject and has reasoned hard is much more
likely to make true judgments that are not, strictly speaking, inferred."85
Ewing puts neatly and convincingly what all of these writers are assert-
ing. The faculty psychology which supposed the existence of an innate
moral sense is obsolete. There is no innate warning bell that tells us that
a proposed act is wrong. When we know that we are about to do wrong
there is a long personal history of exhortation, thinking, and actual conduct.
The result is to reduce reflection on each act to a minimum. If we react
'like a flash," we can attribute it to our society and the acculturation
process. But, of course, as often as not there is no flash and we must think
,ut what we must do. One way or another, the evaluation process is
cognitive.
B. The Emotive Theory of Ethics
A topic in modem ethics arousing intense feeling is the conception of
ethics known as the emotive theory of ethics. It is just one more point of
general disagreement in this field, but a review of some of the contrasting
contentions will show what these writers are thinking and talking about.
Charles Stevenson's work is one of the focal points in the discussion about
this particular theory of ethics.
As can be seen from the title, Stevenson's Ethics and Language discusses
two subjects. Subsequent writers have appeared to pay slight attention to
his thoughts on language and have pounced upon his ethical theories.8
85. Ewn G, op. cit. supra note 49, at 65.
86. The general criticisms directed at the whole school of linguistic philosophers, for
example, in GELLNER, Woins AND THINGS (1960), have also been directed specifically
at the ethical theory representatives of the school. Dr. Edel has spoken of language
becoming the master and not the servant and, on its own, laying down the nature and
function of ethical theory. EDEL, ETHIcAL Jun mENr 83 (1955). "I do not find very
enlightening the prevailing intellectual fashion imported from Oxford that philosophy is
a962]
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Some of the voiced criticisms of these theories will be considered here.
During this discussion it should be borne in mind that there are significant
consequences for jurisprudence if an ethical statement is noncognitive and
is intended only to express or to evoke emotion.
Of the writers we are using, Toulmin has the least trouble with Steven-
son, whom he regards merely as a writer in philosophical ethics who has
taken a limited view of what is involved in ethical reasoning. However
subtle Stevenson's work may be, for Toulmin, it is simply that of another
writer who adopts the subjective theory of ethics. The basic subjective
argument is that "in saying that anything is good or right, we are reporting
on the feelings which we (or the members of our social group) have
towards it."87
This subjective view of ethics appears to have the fatal weakness that
ethical disagreements have no useful meaning if good and bad represent
only personal preferences. There is no apparent reason for paying any
attention to other people's moral views because, Toulmin argues, no view
requiring special reference to the speaker can give an account of a good
reason for an ethical judgment or provide any standard for criticizing
ethical reasoning. A neutral reference, not common to speaker or listener,
is needed for such a standard. As we proceed in this essay, more will be
heard about Toulmin's continuing search for good reasons in ethics.
Toulmin does not feel that Stevenson's more elaborate version adds
anything to the basic subjective theory of ethics. The reason for this is
that Toulmin has already announced his central theme, the search for good
reasons in ethics, and no matter how elaborate the theory, the subjective
approach provides no solution for this problem. In fact, Stevenson rejects
as "devoid of interest" the problem of validity in ethics88 and, according to
Toulmin, writers like Stevenson would say that reasons in ethics "have no
use except to indicate those reasons and inferences you are psychologically
disposed to accept."8 9
Mrs. Bowes singles out for special attack the Attitude Theory of Morals
as advocated by Stevenson.90 She gives a more satisfactory statement than
Toulmin's of what Stevenson actually said. When a moral disagreement
takes place, it is, according to Stevenson, either a disagreement in beliefs
or a disagreement in attitudes. If the former, the disagreement can be
resolved by an investigation of the facts. If the split is with respect to
attitudes, facts will not help. Attitudes cannot ordinarily be changed by
reference to facts; they must be changed by persuasion. When an attitude
primarily a matter of linguistic analysis." WwIENm, VALUES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
IN ASPECTS OF VALUE 39 (Gruber ed. 1959).
87. ToULIwN, op. cit. supra note 74, at 29.
88. STEvENSON, op. cit. supra note 44, at 155.
89. Toumrmr, op. cit. supra note 74, at 42.
90. BowEs, op. cit. supra note 83, at 96.
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is embodied in an ethical judgment, the change of attitude must be done
by persuading the holder that his attitude is wrong and that the alternative
attitude is the better way of looking at the problem. The basis of the
change is emotive and imperative. The speaker says: "This is the good;
do it." In this sentence there is no new information, but there is an expres-
sion of approval and an appeal to follow the suggested course. It is thus
argued that reasons may have no effect. They may well be only a make-
weight. Their connection with the attitude is psychological, not logical.
Stevenson's argument is that ethical terms are emotive and imperative in
nature.
Mrs. Bowes agrees with Stevenson's emphasis upon attitudes as the real
source of moral disagreements and concurs in the emotional character of
the reorientation of attitudes. However, she lists four positions held by
Stevenson to which, in her discussion, she objects. They are:
(a) That producing an emotional orientation towards an issue (i.e., a pro-attitude)
is merely a matter of appealing to feelings; (b) that the meaning of ethical terms
is emotive; (c) that the relation between a set of beliefs and an ethical attitude
can only be psychological and never logical; and (d) that ethical judgments
cannot significantly be called "valid" or "tre."91
These are important objections and an understanding of each of them
will advance our understanding of the entire field of scholarship that we
are here considering.
First, Mrs. Bowes does not believe that the creation of pro-attitude is
merely a matter of appealing to the feelings.92 This sentence appears to
say that the creation of an emotional orientation toward an issue is not
merely a matter of emotion. This may be sufficient to make the point the
author has in mind. She asserts that to state that "X is good" may, as a
matter of fact, not arouse any emotion at all. And, further, there must be
more to changing an attitude in every case than the emotional upheaval
caused by saying "X is good." She, of course, is urging that, in many cases,
the rational (or factual) aspects of the case may persuade the listener to
change his attitude. Stevenson would agree in all cases where the disagree-
ment was with respect to beliefs and not to attitudes. But he would demand
a rigid analysis to determine what was the point of disagreement. Mrs.
Bowes is not precise enough here but her intended point seems discernible,
91. Id. at 98.
92. For Stevenson, beliefs are concerned with how situations are to be truthfully
described and explained; attitudes are concerned with how the same situations are to
be favored or disfavored and how they are shaped by human efforts. STEVENSON, op.
cit. supra note 44, at 7. "An attitude is a disposition (capacity) to act in certain ways
and to experience certain feelings." Id. at 90. An emotion is a feeling or attitude with
attitudes being more complicated than feelings. Id. at 60. For Mrs. Bowes, an emotion
seems equivalent to Stevenson's feeling. BowEs, op. cit. supra note 83, at 99 n.1. For




that where the disagreement is in attitude and not in belief, the disagree-
ment cannot in every case be resolved by emotional means alone; rational,
arguments can change attitudes. Even though Stevenson appears at times to
agree with this view, it is an illusion. He continues to insist in his chapter
on Validity93 that only beliefs are changed by persuasion but does admit
that the method of persuasion may be predominantly emotive or predomi-
nantly rational. In this sense then, Stevenson does not say that "emotional
orientation towards an issue . . . is merely a matter of appealing to,
feelings."
Mrs. Bowes next objects to the suggestion that the meaning of ethical
terms is emotive. Stevenson has an extended discussion of "meaning"04
with the conclusion that the meaning of a word is its disposition or capacity
to affect a hearer. Descriptive meaning is the disposition of a word to
affect cognition. "Emotive meaning is a meaning in which the response
(from the hearer's point of view) or the stimulus (from the speaker's point
of view) is a range of emotions."95 No sentence was found in Stevenson s.
book that said that the meaning of ethical terms is wholly and exclusively
emotive. The word "good," for example, has descriptive characteristics but
it would be folly to deny that, for Stevenson, the normative quality of good,
is in its emotive meaning. However much he affirms the necessity of
rationality and cognition in making ethical judgments, he never really
budges from his argument that ethical terms have a predominantly emotive
meaning.
Mrs. Bowes' concept of morality does not permit her to accept ethical
terms as having only emotive meanings. The meaning of ethical terms
must accord with the moral point of view. This point of view has a
specific character and, as she states, its "ultimate standard of judgment is
the requirement that individual human beings should behave in such a
way as to be as happy as it is in their nature to be and as to let others
be happy in the same way as well."96 The author would expect ethical
terms to be consistent with this standard in addition to evoking emotion
and urging action. The demand that ethical terms have the requirement of
consistency with the moral point of view is sufficient to show that their
meaning is more than merely emotive.
Mrs. Bowes next denies Stevenson's argument that the relation between
a set of beliefs and an ethical attitude can only be psychological and never
logical. Since this involves the place of logic in ethical reasoning, she also
discusses Stevenson's argument that ethical judgments cannot significantly
be called "valid" or "true."
These objections require an examination of "the logic of moral discourse."
93. STEvENsoN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 152.
94. Id. at 37.
95. Id. at 59.
96. BowEs, op. cit. supra note 83, at 100.
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The phrase could well be a contradiction of terms in that logic does not
deal in ethical terms. The traditional definition of logic is that it is the
study of the laws of valid inference. The principal problems studied in
logic are those dealing with the relation of implication between proposi-
tions. A proposition (conclusion) is implied by another proposition (ante-
cedent) when, if the antecedent is true, the conclusion is also true. But
valid inference does not depend upon the actual truth of the propositions
used. A perfectly valid series of conclusions could be inferred about
three-headed men with no necessary inference either that the conclusions
were true or that such men existed.
Traditional logic deals with propositions. A proposition is a sentence,
declarative in form, in which it can be of significance that it is true or
false. This latter requirement thus eliminates questions, commands, and
ethical sentences. A valid syllogism cannot be constructed of ought-
sentences. Nor, on the other hand, can we have a mixture of declarative
sentences and ethical sentences. David Hume was one of the first of the
modem philosophers who pointed out that an ought-sentence cannot
logically be deduced from a set of is-sentences.9 This is now general
knowledge and has precipitated the argument as to what kind of logic is
valid for ethical reasoning.
Mrs. Bowes cuts through this problem rather easily by changing the
meaning of the words being used. She states that "there is no reason why
the term 'logic' should be restricted to induction or deduction. The term
'logic' or logical' is also used to signify any necessity that we find to be
involved in any process of thought."9 Hence, it follows that there is no
problem in speaking of "validity" when discussing moral reasoning. "Valid-
ity" will mean something like "having logical force"10 and will turn on
97. COHEN & NAGEL, AN INTnODUCTION TO LoGic AND SciENTIFic METhoD 12
(1934); STEBBiNG, A MoDERN ELEMENTARY LoGic 6 (5th ed.).
98. 2 HuME, A TnREASE OF Hum&r NATURE 177-78 (Everyman's ed. 1911). Arnold
Brecht doesn't think Hume deserves credit for helping establish the modem doctrine of
the logical gulf between the Is and Ought. Brecht believes that the doctrine did not
really enter modem thought until late in the 19th century. BREcHT, POLITCAL THEORY
539-540 passim (1959).
99. Bows, op. cit. supra note 83, at 103. "[Tlhere would appear to be no convinc-
ing reason why such a leap from the domain of the descriptive to the realm of the
normative should necessarily be subjected to censure. There exist strong factual (though
not logical) bonds between the 'is' and the 'ought,' and the evaluative impulse in
human nature is so strong that the bridge from a factual truth to a postulate is easily
crossed." Bodenheimer, The Province of jurisprudence, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 6 (1960).
100. Prof. Adams comments that the good-reasons moral philosopher "agrees with
the classical naturalist that there are factual validity-grounds for an ethical judgment.
... He is able to accomplish .. . this by the recognition of a new kind of argument,
an ethical argument, which is neither deductive nor inductive. It is an argument with
factual premises which support an ethical conclusion, but the 'support' is of a differ-
ent kind from any recognized by the logicians." ADAMS, ETHicAL. NATruALm AND
TME MODERN WoRLD-VIEW 101 (1960). "There is a relation between an ethical judg-
ment and a factual situation such that we can see the former is justified by the latter,
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the reasonableness of the reasons given for an ethical decision. The
necessity involved flows from the fact that "certain conceptions and not
others are acceptable as suitable standards of moral evaluation."'' 1 In this
view, "we shall not be satisfied merely by being told that moral issues
arouse the emotions of approval and disapproval. We also want to know
why it is that we approve of certain things and disapprove of others, and
what are the standards, acceptable by all from a rational point of view,
by which we judge certain things as worthy of moral approval. Hence the
importance of belief or cognition in a philosophical treatment of Ethics." 10 2
The problem of the relation of the factual to the normative is of great
importance and will be looked into at some length later in this essay. The
position to be taken in this essay will be that it is undeniable that natural
and social facts have a direct bearing on what we ought to do and can
rationally be brought into play in making moral decisions.
Professor Adams also discusses the emotivists but in his own special
terms. One of his main objectives is to identify all forms of ethical
naturalism and reveal the weakness of each. It is with what Adams calls
"emotive naturalism"03 that we are here most interested. This type of
naturalism had its most prominent statement in Ayer's Language, Truth
and Logic.104 Ayer simply asserted that ethical propositions were nonsense
and meaningless. They were empirically unverifiable and therefore meant
nothing (meaning is determined by empirical verification). The fact is,
Ayer says, that ethical propositions "are pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood."10 5
As Professor Adams observes, these claims are "shocking" to many
people10 6 and have produced a large assortment of critics, among whom is
numbered Professor Adams. His first step is to examine what it means to
say that ethical sentences are meaningless. Stevenson, it will be recalled,
devoted a chapter to enlarging the scope of "meaning" so that he could say
that "a sign's disposition [power, capacity] to affect a hearer is to be called
a 'meaning .. .' ,"107 Adams is not satisfied with this and makes the point
that a sentence has a use in the language and it is that use which gives the
though we cannot prove this by logic." EwrNG, SECOND THOUGHTS IN MORAL PIrlLOSO-
Piy 35 (1959).
101. BowEs, op. cit. supra note 83, at 104.
102. Id. at 106.
103. ADAms, op. cit. supra note 100.
104. Ayms, LANGUAGE, Tntum Am LocIC (2d ed. 1948) (first published in 1936).
105. Id. at 108.
106. Some critics appear quite outraged. One ethical naturalist argues that Steven-
son's thesis is that "so-called ethical judgments are partly descriptive of one's personal
attitudes, partly attempts to influence others." In his haughtiest tones, he then adds:
"The august imperative quality of the traditional moral law is enfeebled in this picture
of personal flats attempting to seduce one another." EDEL, ErnlcAL JUDGMNT 27
(1955).
107. SExvrNsoN, ETmcs kND LANGUAGE 57 (1960).
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sentence meaning. Thus, by definition, we may decide that ethical terms
express emotion. If this is done it follows that ethical terms cannot desig-
nate an objective ethical property or feature of reality because that is not
their use. Adams would, therefore, say that it makes no difference whether
we say "ethical and emotive meaning" or "ethical and emotive use."10
8
The author pursues this theme of the division of labor in language. Value-
language is primarily the language of affection and conation. Such language
has the power to arouse emotion independently of empirical meaning. It
acquired this power by conditioning; such a power is not innate in the
words themselves. With these views, we can understand why Professor
Adams concludes:
Moral "reasoning," according to the [emotive] theory, is simply doing something
to get a desired effect, throwing words around to produce feelings and attitudes
casually in the hearer, like fertilizing, watering, and hoeing flowers to make them
grow. There is no question of the validity of moral judgments as such, only of
their effectiveness. 10 9
This argument is, for Adams, not a realistic one. He holds that emotive
attitudes are not simply independent natural occurrences. They are a part
of a moral situation and are part of what is reasoned about. In this latter
sense, they must be cognitive. If both of these contentions are true, the
emotive theory of ethics, as defined, is not adequate. Professor Adams
demonstrates his arguments by analyzing the nature of an emotive attitude.
He says that we do not just make an emotive utterance. The utterance is
a symptom of an opinion or belief already held. Any sentence not only
expresses an attitude and a belief but also the content of the belief. This
content, which he calls its semantic content or dimension, means that the
sentence describes something and, by so much, does more than express or
cause an emotion or feeling. "Thinking that the act is an injustice or a
wrong to someone is an integral part of the feeling of indignation .... 110
The moral judgment "is the semantic content of the attitude. The emotive
state makes a cognitive claim ... ."M This demonstration of an inescap-
able connection between this reasoning and our ultimate moral choices is
held to be fatal to the emotive theory of ethics.
As a consequence of this analysis, Professor Adams concludes that the
emotive theory of ethics is naturalistic. No proponent of this theory posits
an existing entity called "Value." When value-language is used to designate,
it designates natural qualities that are recognizable by the language of
science, such as moral claims and emotions. The reality is that of the
empirical and there is no separate entity that includes "values."
108. ADAmS, op. cit. supra note 100, at 81.
109. Id. at 85.
110. Id. at 91.
111. Id. at 92.
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We have thus seen three writers (Toulmin, Bowes, and Adams) who,
each for his own reasons, find a purely emotive theory of ethics impossible
to conceive, prove, or use for discussion. They, of course, are not alone.
Dr. Ewing is probably speaking for the majority of students in this field
when he declares that "everybody would admit the presence of cognitive,
conative and affective factors alike in the typical moral attitudes; the only
dispute is as to their relative place and functions."" 2 The writers we have
studied insist that Stevenson believes that moral judgments are purely
emotive and that, therefore, he is wrong." 3
It is recommended that a final decision not be made on Stevenson's
work. The complexity of Stevenson's analysis suggests that he intends more
than a simple reduction of ethical terms to some emotive meaning. Time
and again he reiterates his belief that effective ethical understanding calls
for the fullest range of knowledge of science and human nature. There
can be little doubt that he favors a rational approach whenever a choice
must be made. But then, in the decisive chapters vhen ethical sentences
are analyzed, he persists in arguing that ethical sentences are emotive and
imperative in meaning. This is not the place to do justice to Stevenson.
Our purpose is served by showing the nature of the controversy that his
work has produced.
It may occur to a reader that Stevenson limits the scope of ethics almost
as sharply as does Toulmin. Toulmin would limit attack upon the ultimate
principles adopted as ethical standards. Questioning of these principles,
he would say, is not ethics. There can be no ethical reasoning except inside
the system of beliefs adopted. On his side, Stevenson is precluding debate
on the cognitive level over attitudes except insofar as such debate is persua-
sive. He regards the origins of moral ideas as beyond the scope of his
work. This appears to refer to the origin of attitudes. He therefore starts
with existing attitudes and discusses the means of changing them. He
insists that these means can only be persuasive. One cannot be argued out
of an attitude. However, good reasons can be given that will induce a
change in attitude. This fine distinction weakens Stevenson's overall effort.
He tries to keep out what insists on coming in-facts and reasons for ethical
choices.
It should have occurred to the reader by now that this is not a problem
from which the student of legal philosophy can stand aloof. If ethical judg-
ments are not determinable by rational debate and are not amenable to
112. EwING, op. cit. supra note 100, at 6. "The emotive theory was overthrown
partly by a return to common sense; it was felt that, surely, ethical statements must
somehow be regarded as rational, defensible by argument and reference to fact."
MurnocH, MrAPHYsIcs AND ETmcs IN THE NATuRE OF MErTArHrsics 102 (Pears ed.
1957).
113. "Probably very few would now defend the view that ethical sentences just
express emotions as feelings." Ewinu, op. cit. supra note 100, at 7.
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change from such debate, our problem is complicated if we hope to develop
a body of ethical doctrine capable of immediate influence upon our legal
decisions. A few quotations are pertinent to show that legal philosophy has
not been left untouched by emotive theory.
The word "ought" and the like are imperative expressions which are used in order
to impress a certain behaviour on people. It is sheer nonsense to say that they
signify a reality. Their sole function is to work on the minds of people, directing
them to do this or that or to refrain from something else-not to communicate
knowledge about the state of things. By means of such expressions the lawgivers
are able to influence the conduct of state officials and of the public in general.11 4
Another Scandinavian legal philosopher maintains:
The moral attitude (sense of morality) ... is a direct and unqualified attitude
toward a norm of action or social order. It is irrational in the sense that it is the
expression of an emotion and is inaccessible to justification and argumentation." 5
As usual in practical problems it is not possible to prove the rightness of the
attitude itself that is adopted, but only to discuss the beliefs that condition it.n6
An explanation of much of Kelsen's work can be gleaned from his con-
ception of ethical terms. For example:
The problem of values is in the first place the problem of conflicts of values, and
this problem cannot be solved by means of rational cognition. The answer to these
questions is a judgment of value, determined by emotional factors, and, therefore,
subjective in character-valid only for the judging subject. .... 117
And again:
"[J]ustice" connotes an absolute value. Its content cannot be ascertained by the
Pure Theory of Law. Indeed it is not ascertainable by rational knowledge at all.
The history of human speculation for centuries has been the history of a vain striv-
ing after a solution of the problem. That striving has hitherto led only to the
emptiest of tautologies, such as the formula suum cuique or the categoric impera-
tive. From the standpoint of rational knowledge there are only interests and con-
flicts of interests, the solution of which is arrived at by an arrangement which
may either satisfy the one interest at the expense of the other, or institute an
equivalence or compromise between them. To determine, however, whether this
or that order has an absolute value, that is, is "just" is not possible by the methods
of rational knowledge. Justice is an irrational ideal. However indispensable it may
be for the willing and acting of human beings it is not viable by reason.118
The reader should by now be getting a sense of how modem ethical
writers talk and what they discuss. Admitting that there is virtually no
unanimity in the field, nevertheless it cannot be inferred that all is chaos.
The following quotation from one of Lon Fullers articles appears to be an
114. OiaVECRONA, LAW AS FACT 21-22 (1939).
115. Ross, ON LAw AND JusTIcE 367 (1958).
116. Id. at 368.
117. KELSEN, WHAT Is JUsTCE? 4 (1957).
118. Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 50 L.Q. REv. 474, 482 (1034).
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extravagant and incomplete statement of modem ethical theory. He asserts
that a view of the present state of ethical theory calls to mind a picture
something like this.
A human being, A, is engaged in doing some act, such as giving money to a beggar,
or paying a gambling debt .... An observer, 0, points to A's action and is heard
to say, "This is good." At this signal ethical theoreticians begin swarming in from
all sides. Their first act is to relieve the scene of the encumbrance of A, who is
ousted without ceremony. This done, all gather round 0 and embark on a lively
disputation .... How shall we characterize that sentence 0 just uttered, "This is
good"? What is its "semiotic status"? Is it a mere ejaculation equally meaningful
and equally meaningless, whether emitted in private or in public? .... Or is it
perhaps a kind of news report to others about O's inner state? Is it such a report
coupled with an invitation to others that they join in this inner state? Or instead
of being viewed as a mere invitation, shall O's remark be interpreted as demanding
or claiming that others should or must share his approving glow? Is 0 announcing
an invitation or a directive that others do what A was just observed to do? At
this point someone is heard to shout, "You are wrong, 0. What A did was bad, not
good." 0 starts to defend himself . . . [Tlhe theorists . . . begin debating the
kinds of demonstrations or assertions that 0 may properly employ in supporting his
position. Can he only say, "Well, I feel that way"? Or can he adduce something
that can be called "proof," "validation," "justification," or "explanation" for his
position?119
Fuller concludes that "if ethical theory is ever to escape from the wordy
muddle in which it is now bogged down, ... the first step will have to be
to bring A back on the scene."
Fuller insists that this is a realistic view of modem ethics and urges his
readers, as proof, to examine an article by George Nakhnikian. 20 This
article is of limited support for Professor Fuller since, for example, only a
few lines are given to the naturalists. It may also be recognized that most
of the writers here being reviewed do not talk in this style. There is some
justice in Professor NageFs observation that neither the description of cur-
rent ethical theory nor its wholesale condemnation by Fuller is well in-
formed.'
2 '
In another form the emotive theory has had its impact upon legal theory.
For example, it will be argued in this essay that if rules of law are derived
from principles and if they are subject to revision if not productive of a
maximum or social satisfaction, it is hard to believe that such rules are
purely emotive. However, in opposition to this opinion is that of Glanville
Williams who states:
A rule of law is not a referential statement. It is not meant to be a statement
about what has actually happened or is happening in the world, nor is it meant
exactly as a prophecy. Not yet is it merely a tautology. . .. [I)t must be a
119. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NATuRAL L.F. 83, 99 (1958).
120. Nakhnikian, Contemporary Ethical Theories and Jurisprudence, 2 NATUMAL L.F.
4(1957).
121. Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human Purpose, 4 NATURAL L.F. 26, 41 (1959).
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value-judgement. . . Every legal proposition is reducible in the last analysis .to
the affirmation or denial of an "ought".... Thus the whole of the law consists of
emotive statements. As with most other emotive statements there is a referential
element, but not such as to make the statement a proposition of fact.
122
We have previously noted the objections to a wholly emotive ethics. The
same reasons apply to this narrow problem. Neither an ethical judgment
nor a rule of law is wholly emotive. Professor Morris Cohen, the father
of Felix Cohen, has made the point that norms are more than mere
expressions of feeling or preference. "Norms must be general, and in order
to be rational must be consistent. . . .A rational norm tells us which of
two values we should prefer, because it assigns a reason or ground for such
preference."123 Professor Cohen argues that it is only by empirical evidence
that we decide upon our preferences and refine our ideals.124 Professor
Kimpel flatly rejects Williams' view and says that "evaluations of moral
worth are factual propositions, in the sense that their soundness can be
tested by "facts."15 Such a view seems inevitable, once we start insisting
that consequences are the test of ethical decisions. Felix Cohen simply
states that "Ought propositions are ... always reducible to is propositions.
... Values are facts."
126
The position towards which this essay is moving was set forth some years
ago by Huntingdon Cairns in the following language:
Finally, legal philosophy must undertake the evaluation of the suppositions and
objects of the legal order. No more important assignment faces jurisprudence as a
whole. . . .We are told today that values lie beyond the reach of knowledge,
particularly of an empirical kind; that what we like or dislike is wholly a matter
of our emotions. We are told also that this opinion is false. If the first view is
correct then the idea that law is a form of social control that can direct human
conduct to desirable ends is sheer fantasy. It means that societal processes, in the
great turns and reversals that they exhibit, are at the mercy of blind impulses
and unseeing imponderables. Against that view is the circumstance that it has not
been demonstrated that the methods of science are not applicable to the evaluation
of moral judgments. There is still reason to believe, therefore, that the ethical
aspect of jurisprudence will someday yield to rational manipulation. Beyond this
point, notwithstanding the elaborate analysis to which the topic is everywhere sub-
jected, it seems impossible today to go with caution.1
27
C. The "Is" and the "Ought"
Up to this point, we may conclude that there are many students of ethics
who subscribe to the belief that ethical decisions are not founded on some
simple element but are the end result of an intricate combination of cona-
122. Williams, Language and the Law-V, 62 L.Q. REv. 378, 395-96 (1946).
123. Momus COHEN, A PREFACE TO Locic 156 (1944).
124. See also MoMUS COHEN, REASON AND NATuRE 427 (1931).
125. KYm EL, PIUNciPLEs OF MoRAL PimLosopHy 141 (1960).
126. CoHEN, ETrcAL SYsTEMs AND LEGAL IDFALs 116 (1959).
127. CA Nus, LEGAL PHmosoPY F1 OM PLATO TO HEGEL 566 (1949).
19621
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
live, cognitive, emotive, and factual elements. The uprising against the
emotive theory of ethics in any form is notable. The rejection of any simple
form of intuition and the inclusion in the term of strong influences from
experience and reflection are further evidence of the trend. The wide
popularity of Toulmin's work and the discussion of ethics in terms of good
reasons is another sign that there are many people who insist that a rational
and reasonable attitude must remain the sovereign factor in determining
ethical decisions. The dominant factor in good reasons for such decisions
resides in the establishment of close relations with the actual social facts
of a particular society.
What now appears to need examination is the general scope of ethics
suggested by some of these various writers. If that be done we may then
be somewhat advanced in our effort to see what ethical theory has to
contribute to legal philosophy.
The process of developing an ethical code, a system of moral principles,
is not simply one of resolving conflicts as they arise. Included also is the
development of a set of ideals towards which we believe we are striving.
These ideals are also principles. The point being that the facts and needs
of our life in society influence not only our immediate ethical responses to
situations but also our ultimate aims. It cannot therefore be denied that
social facts must have some relation to our moral decisions. And we
should no longer delay some decision on the nature of this relation.
In the earlier discussion of some of the objections to the emotive theory
of ethics, mention was made of how, even though traditional deductive
logic seemed to prevent a direct connection between factual beliefs and
ethical attitudes, nevertheless, students in this field, in their own fashion,
have found a way out of the problem. For example, Professor Bodenheimer
was noted as saying that the factual truth was of such import to the evalua-
tion that there should be no difficulty in bridging the gap between the is
and the ought even though the bridge was not a logical one.128
There is a psychological security that comes with thinking logically. It
is part of our life to think according to the rules of logic. When we know
A and B are true and that C is a valid inference from A and B, we feel no
desire to ask any more questions. This is the kernel of our ethical problem.
We want to be guided by reason, we want to use our new knowledge about
the world to make it a better world morally, and yet there is alleged to be
no assured and generally accepted process that will lead us from the new
and the true to the good.
The above paragraph is plausible but it is incomplete. The symmetry of
a logical argument may be a beauty in itself but it does not necessarily
lead to truth, action, or value. Some method must be devised whereby, with
128. See note 99 supra. "Validity has nothing to do with persuasive methods."
STEVENSON, op. cit. supra note 107, at 152.
[VOL.. 15
ETHICAL THEORY
assurance, we can make ethical decisions in a rational manner.
The important point, therefore, becomes where we shall start. It will be
recalled that Moore stressed the fact that so much of our difficulty in
ethical discussion came from a failure to decide what questions we desired
to answer.129 Accordingly, suppose we ask "What is the good?" It has been
previously indicated that from Moore we will learn very little about good
and nothing at all about duty. It must be clear that, if we simply define
good, no inference arises that we ought to do the good. This is unsatisfac-
tory to many. 30 For example, Dewey remarks that "the genuine issue is not
whether certain values . . . have being already (whether that of existence
or of essence), but what concrete judgment we are to form about ends
and means in the regulation of practical behavior."131 Let us assume that
we need not posit the existence of some additional entity like good nor some
new world of reality like value. Instead, let us make the decisive question
be '"hat is a good act?" From this question, we can move on with the
definitions like the good act is the one we ought to do. We can skip the
query as to why we should do good, since as Toulmin notes, this isn't a
real question. What else is there to do? We therefore assume that we
ought to do the good act; this is equivalent to saying that it is our duty to
do such an act. Speaking in this manner, we can then concentrate on what
are our duties.13 The answer to be adopted in this essay is that good acts,
our duties, are acts in accordance with the ultimate rules and principles of
our society.
This, of course, focuses attention on the nature of such principles. To
that problem, we shall now address our attention. The writers we are
examining will first be queried, but, as we shall see, we shall have to
broaden our study to get a glimpse of the origis and coverage of such
principles.
Our writers all consider at length the nature of ethical principles al-
though, it may be noted that they do not look to the historical origins of
the principles. All agree that ethical conduct is principled. Ewing points
out that the difficulties in conduct arise from a conflict in available princi-
ples. For this reason, he espouses the idea of a principle embodying a
prima facie duty.133 That is, we ought to follow a principle unless there be
a superior reason advanced against following it. "[T]o say that something
is good ... is only to say that we have a prima facie duty to further it."13
The sufficiency of the reasons for not performing a prima facie duty is part
129. MoonE, Pnmcn'r& E-mcA at vii (1959).
130. Some of Moore's students regretted this result. See HAmRoD, THE LrFE OF
JoHN MAYNArD KEYNES 75, 214 (1951).
131. DEvEy, THE QUEsT FoR CwrTAnlry 46 (1929).
132. The reader is advised that almost two generations of British philosophers are
thus dismissed in these sentences.
133. Ewnm7, op. cit. supra note 100, at 124.
134. Id. at 127.
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of the general code of the society. For example, there is certainly a prima
facie obligation to keep one's promises and yet, as Ewing notes, "[I]t is
occasionally more in accord with benevolence and fairness to break a prom-
ise rather than to keep it."135
Mrs. Bowes argues along the same lines. For her, "a principle is a positive
conception of a suitability and it orients us in certain directions rather than
in others."1' She explains that "general principles have no more than a
broad regulative function in determining what we should actually do."
Generality of principles is desirable since it leaves us a broad range within
which to use our discretion. Principles become established only by persons
acting in accordance with them. A child cannot become a saint merely by
learning specific principles; he must live in accordance with them.
Duties, for Mrs. Bowes, refer to "particular acts most suitable from the
point of view of morality to particular situations in which an agent is called
upon to act."13 7 It is right that we follow a principle but we have only a
prima facie duty or obligation to do so. If the particular situation has one
relevant moral aspect, we follow the governing principle. But the deter-
mination of which principle governs is the "one that is suitable to the total
situation as viewed morally and not merely to any particular feature of
it."13 8 Principles thus serve as standards of conduct. They represent the
right and the suitable course. Duties are confined to particular acts and
are, strictly speaking, right acts. Thus, it is useful to note that what is
right in general may sometimes appear self-evident, whereas what is right
in particular, the duty called for, is what creates the difficulties in ethical
decision. And it is the continuing use of our intelligence in selecting the
correct duties in accordance with our moral principles that is the hallmark
of the truly moral man. There is no readymade solution to moral problems.
Toulmin's view is that principles are "shorthand summaries of experi-
ence."13 9 In any particular community, certain principles are current-that
is to say, attention is paid to certain types of argument, as appealing to ac-
135. Id. at 134. The similarity should be noted between Ewing's prima facie obli-
gation and Pound's conception of stare decisis. "[S]tare decisis is a feature of the com-
mon-law technique of decision. That technique is one of finding the grounds of
decision in reported judicial experience, making for stability by requiring adherence to
decisions of the same question in the past, and allowing growth and change by free-
dom of choice among competing analogies of equal authority when new questions
arise or old ones take on new forms .... "
"It should be noted . . .that when definite states of fact vary markedly, rules cease
to be more than starting points of analogical reasoning. In most cases other analogies
are at hand so that a more satisfactory starting point for the different state of facts
may be found and the question may be put on a basis in touch with the exigencies of
the time and place by the ordinary technique of drawing a distinction." 3 PoUND,
JuIsPRTuDENcE 562-63 (1959).
136. Bows, THE CONCEPT OF MonArry 178 (1959).
137. Id. at 180.
138. Id. at 181.
139. ToULmN, AN ExAmiNA o N oF TiE PLACE OF RFAso rN ETmcs 18 (1958).
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cepted criteria of "'real goodness,' 'real rightness".... And'just such a set
of principles, of 'prima facie obligations,' of 'categorical imperatives,' is
what we call the 'moral code' of the community." 140 But the most impor-
tant principle adopted or assumed by Toulmin is that of the function of
ethics.
Toulmin says that the function of ethics is "to correlate our feelings and
behaviour in such a way as to make the fulfilment of everyone's aims and
desires as far as possible compatible,"141 or, again, "to reconcile the inde-
pendent aims and wills of a community of people." 42 This harmony is
clearly designed for a particular community or society.
We thus have a function of ethics that brings happiness and creates har-
mony. Actions are classified as they are suitable for achieving objectives.
Below this grand objective are the series of principles which enable one to
see how the harmony is, in general, achieved. The process of achieving this
harmony has actions tested by principles; principles, by consequences; and
consequences, by agreement with the function of ethics. What we deter-
mine to be the function of ethics is the ultimate or highest principle. If
we use the word "good" at this point, it must mean "in accordance with an
ultimate principle."
Since Moore has said that all propositions about the good are synthetic,
he concludes that all such propositions "must rest in the end upon some
proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected, which cannot be
logically deduced from any other proposition." 43 This result, he says, "may
be otherwise expressed by saying that the fundamental principles of Ethics
must be self-evident." By self-evident, however, Moore means that, in a
logical sense, the principle is not inferred from another proposition. He
does not mean that such proposition is true. There can be no reasons which
prove such propositions true.
This inability to establish by any scientific method the truth of ultimate
principles is the theme of Arnold Brecht's Political Theory, published in
1959. He concludes that:
140. Id. at 140.
141. Id. at 137.
142. Id. at 170. Social engineering "conceives of the legal ordering of society as a
practical process in eliminating friction and waste in the attainment of human desires."
POUND, CRIMUNAL JUsTIcE IN AmMEUcA 3 (1930). Social engineering is the "idea of
giving the most complete security and effect to the whole scheme of human demands
or desires, which have pressed or are pressing for recognition and securing, with the
least sacrifice of the scheme as a whole, the least friction, the least waste." Pound,
Fift Years of Jurisprudence, 51 HPAv. L. REv. 444, 777, 810 (1938). "1 have come
to feel that instead of putting the task of law, as William James did, in terms of
satisfying as much as we can of the total of human demands, we do better to speak
of providing as much as we may of the total of men's reasonable expectations in life
in civilized society with the minimum of friction and waste." Pound, The Role of the
Will in Law, 68 H. v. L. REv. 1, 19 (1954).
143. MooRE, op. cit. supra note 129, at 143.
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(1) The question whether something is "valuable" can be answered scientifi-
cally only in relation to
(a) some goal or purpose for the pursuit of which it is or is not useful (valu-
able), or to
(b) the ideas held by some person or group of persons regarding what is or is
not valuable:
and that, consequently,
(2) it is impossible to establish scientifically what goals are valuable irrespective
of
(a) the value they have in the pursuit of other goals or purposes, or
(b) of someone's idea about ulterior or ultimate goals or purposes. 144
According to what Brecht calls Scientific Value Relativism, "'ultimate,'
'highest,' or 'absolute' values or 'standards of values' are 'chosen' by mind
or will, or possibly . . . 'grasped' by faith, intuition or instinct; but they
are not 'proven' by science .... "145 This unpalatable conclusion has led
numerous scholars to seek ways to escape from its limitations. Brecht
devotes a long chapter to descriptions of nine different types of such at-
tempts and demonstrates that all fail to achieve their objective. 146
Even if these principles cannot be demonstrated to be true, we know
they are used as the basis of ethical theories. The query must therefore be
where they come from. A hint as to the answer is given when Toulmin ar-
gues that we cannot usefully compare the principles of a Christian with
those of a Moslem. As stated more exactly by an English legal philosopher:
In acknowledging ultimate ends or moral values we are recognizing something as
much imposed upon us by the character of the world in which we live, as little
a matter of choice, attitude, feeling, emotion as the truth of factual judgments
about what is the case.147
To mention our central theme for a moment, Dean Rostow of Yale Law
School has pointed out that "law is founded on a collective code of com-
mon morality."148 Arising out of the course of history, "the common custom
of a society at any time is a blend of custom and conviction, of reason and
feeling, of experience and prejudice." As part of this process, it follows
that "the law changes as the society changes its notions of what it wants to
achieve through law." As will be developed later, this essay will not con-
clude that law and morals are identical nor that legal changes come about
144. BREcs-rr, POLITICAL THEORY 117-18 (1959).
145. Id. at 118.
146. Id. at 261.
147. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Laws and Morals, 71 HAnv. L. REv.
593, 626 (1958). "There is a diversity among moral codes which may spring either
from the peculiar but real needs of a given society, or from superstition or ignorance."
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 167 (1961).
148. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAmE. L.J. 174, 198. "[Mlost law is
legal reinforcement of cultural and local standards of behavior, of what is considered
right and proper .... LA PiERE, TnE FRxUDIAN ETmc 260 (1959). No legal philos-
opher would agree with this.
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solely from moral urges. The point at issue here is that a society arrives at
a time and place with a set of legal and moral principles and it is from
these principles that any legal or moral developments or changes come.
The study of the sources of our principles and values is the province of
the historian and the sociologist. The study is both general and particular
in nature. Whether there are universal values has not been determined
with any unanimity.149 The usual modem view is expressed in this fashion:
"We . . . assume that different people have worked out different sets of
values from their collective experience in the past, a process which appears
so complex as to be almost inscrutable."m As Santayana said: "An ulti-
mate good is chosen, found, or aimed at; it is not opined."15
A Scandinavian legal philosopher expresses similar ideas in this fashion:
In every community there is a living tradition of culture which finds expression in
more or less uniform ideas as to behaviour in a given situation.1
5 2
The moral attitudes have a social origin, inculcated in a person by suggestive per-
suasion of its environment. The peculiarity of the persuasion that creates morality
is that it happens in the first few years of the person's life.i53
Presumably the values arose out of social needs, such as security or food
scarcity. It is clear not only that there are different needs but that there
are different responses possible to the same needs.154 But once set in
motion, the responses and the needs react upon one another through the
historical process.
Assuming that the mysterious process of history brings us at any par-
ticular moment to the actual values in force in particular society, we are
led to the question of how does change take place in an ethical system.
The issue is that we have principles, rules, and customs which we are
expected to follow. But it is equally obvious that we must make adjust-
ments. A famous example of excessive ethical rigidity is Kant's essay "On
a Supposed Right To Tell Lies From Benevolent Motives."15 5 Kant con-
149. On even such a value as promise-keeping, see note 178 infra. The uniformities
posited by exponents of a natural law can be regarded as shared prejudices. The
exact content of such prejudices must be examined for each society. If an American
does not feel free to kill a man of any other society, it cannot be presumed that there
are not societies which do condone the killing of men in certain outside groups.
150. ANGELL, FnEE Soc-rY A"D MORAL CRIsIS 54 (1958).
151. SANTAYANA, WnDS OF DoctRinE 144 (1913).
152. Ross, ON LAw AND JUsTICE 60-61 (1958).
153. Id. at 365. Professor Kimpel would agree that our principles come from the
social contexts in which we live but they are conceived through our reflection upon
this experience. This is a job for adults, not children. Km4PEL, op. cit. supra note 125,
at 49.
154. For example, see LA ProBE, THE F DtmrDL ETmc (1959), contrasting Max
Weber's Protestant Ethic with what the author describes as the prevailing ethic, the
Freudian Ethic.
155. See KANT, THEORY OF ETmcs 361 (6th ed. Abbott transl. 1927).
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eludes that principles must be strict truths and that there are "never
exceptions to them, since exceptions destroy the universality, on account
of which alone they bear the name of principles." 56 Such an attitude can
become intolerable in practice and of no use in the face of equal choices.
Toulmin points out that deontological ethics are an early development
designed to give form and strength to a community. The rigid duties com-
manded continue to be adhered to so long as there is an agreed-upon need
for them. Some situations, such as driving on the right hand side of the
road, simply call for a universal rule, almost no matter what the rule may
be.
But when conflicts and inadequacies in the codes appear, some technique
for adjustment is necessary. Toulmin argues that historically "the 'deon-
tological" code was at first supreme; the 'teleological criterion now amplifies
it, and provides a standard by which to criticise it. This does not mean
that morality becomes wholly teleological .... All that happens is that the
initially inflexible system of taboos is transformed into a developing moral
code-a code which, in unambiguous cases, remains mandatory, but whose
interpretation in equivocal cases and whose future development are con-
trolled by appeal to the function of ethics; that is, to the general require-
ment that preventable suffering shall be avoided."157
This appeal to the function of ethics is obviously an appeal to the conse-
quences of the proposed courses of action. As previously noted, the conse-
quences are weighed in terms of the function of ethics and the new choice
is made. The result is to emphasize motives of actions and results of social
practices rather than a fixed a priori rule of conduct.
It must be clear that if the ethical act is not determinable until the
consequences are known, then the loud cries for moral standards-absolute
standards-are misplaced. The pragmatic utilitarian approach of so many
modem philosophers deliberately forgoes final predictions on future actions
and submits to actual consequences being the decisive factor in moral
decisions. 58 Some form of ethical relativism must be accepted. At the
very least, it must be acknowledged that different ethical principles may
prevail among different societies. Within one pluralistic society like our
own, strains of several moral codes may co-exist. And finally, within a
society a system of ethics may be changing in time to meet new social
conditions. This aura of flux and change in our ethical thinking should,
in itself, be sufficient to cast doubt upon the very existence of absolute
ethical standards.
But the demand for such standards is persistent. Pound, over the years,
156. Id. at 365.
157. ToU.MIN, op. cit. supra note 139, at 141-42. It also follows that to ensure a
developing moral code the society should remain open and should avoid "the tribal,
tyrannical and collectivist, 'closed' society." Id. at 171.
158. JAFFE, THE PRAG ATIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 14 (1960).
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has been attacked for his failure to have such a measure of value. 159 But
it will be noted that many of his critics have belonged to schools of thought
denying the existence of pluralistic societies and apparently insisting upon
the continuing viability of a deontological ethics.
Those who call for absolute standards of morals usually argue that,
as a part of reality, all men are bound by moral laws not to commit certain
acts. These acts are usually named and are such as murder and robbery.
The objection to arguing that all men abhor murder is that murder is not
the same to all men. Murder is a human act and, in the analysis of H. L. A.
Hart, "our concept of an action, like our concept of property, is a social
concept and logically dependent on accepted rules of conduct."160 In other
words, murder is not a descriptive word; it is ascriptive. We ascribe the
responsibility of a murderous act to a person. He may admit the killing
but deny that it is murder for any of the many reasons established in the
law. Again in Harts term, the ascription of murder is defeasible by any
of the established defences. These defences are peculiar to a particular
society and vary as between societies.
There is no uniformity among societies as to the content of these acts.
There is therefore no absolute standard by which to judge such acts.
Similarly, there is little uniformity among societies as to ultimate ends. On
this point, Dewey argues that ends are sharply delimited by available
means. 161 If means vary among societies, as they indubitably do, the ends
must also vary. There is, therefore, much reason on the available evidence,
for rejecting the very concept of absolute standards.
Ideals adjusted to available means, set in a particular time and place are
necessarily achieved by a piecemeal process. If there are no absolute goals,
it is also true that there are no irrevocable decisions. A man and a judge
are each allowed a margin of error for mistakes. The mistakes may lead to
adjustment of the goals. But the process is what counts. That it be knowl-
edgeable and rational is the essential. We can thus understand Pound's
desire to avoid friction. If it be said that friction is a subjective and vague
concept, this can hardly be the view of the judge with the friction in front
of him demanding relief.
Our doubts about pre-existing absolute standards arise because we
are faced with the march of history in which not even hindsight produces
any patterns in the past. We feel quite sure that the future is entirely un-
predictable. The evidence supports this opinion. Walter Lippman has
said that "the unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been
destructively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have imposed
159. Grossman, The Legal Philosophy of Roscoe Pound, 44 YALE L.J. 605 (1935);
Kennedy, Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law, 9 MARQ. L. Rv. 63 (1925).
160. HAnT, TrE AsCRoPTIoN OF RESpONSiBmrry AND EIGHTs IN LoGic AND LAN-
GUAGE 145, 161 (Flew ed. 1952).
161. Dxw , HrmAN NATunE Am CoNDucT 25 (Mod. Libr. ed. 1930).
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a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials." 162 But it
can hardly be argued that these same officials, if left to themselves, would
have done much better. The past few decades have been replete with
misjudgment and error. Foreign affairs need no argument. The situation is
the same on the domestic scene. Modern living has become a problem
of coping with the unexpected. Longtime trends reverse themselves for
no discernible reason. From a fashion of one or no children, our bright
young adults suddenly want six or more. Everybody has suddenly taken
to the road or the suburb. In every city in the world, traffic and juvenile
delinquency are major problems. The mature economy of the Thirties has
exploded into the riches of the affluent society of the Fifties and Sixties. If
there is or was a pre-existing pattern discernible in all of this, someone
ought sometime to have noticed. Our ideals are shaped by the conse-
quences of natural and social practices. If these consequences cannot be
predicted, the precise application in advance of absolute standards is not
possible.
The difficulty of demonstrating the existence of absolute standards for
testing moral decisions is equalled by that of showing universal moral
standards. When we try to be specific we run into words, like murder,
whose meaning is demonstrably variable. If we try to avoid this pitfall
by being general, the result is vagueness. Writers like Toulmin regard the
problem as impossible. Each society has its unique ethical and moral sys-
tem.
Mrs. Bowes confines the study of ethics to the examination of those
general moral principles which '"ave a general applicability to all human
beings."163 These "value ideals," such as the truth ought to be told or a
life ought to be respected, do not dictate any particular action but serve as
standards for human actions of many different kinds. Dr. Ewing sharpens
up these conceptions. He says that "some ethical propositions are indeed
universally true."16 As an example, he suggests that "it is universally true
that we ought never to commit a murder if by 'murder' is meant wrongful
killing." He notes that such a claim is tautologous but does serve the pur-
pose of showing that we are claiming the existence of a prima facie obliga-
tion not to kill human beings unless there is a special justification for such
killing. Such propositions thus instruct us as to %vhat classifications we
ought to perform with the added qualification of their prima facie charac-
ter.
To return to the words of sociology, a decline of moral integration, an
increase in tensions, calls for an adjustment of the moral web, the complex
of moral norms and institutions. 165 The moral web seeks to stay in equilib-
162. LnL'PmA, THE PUBLIC Pmxosopny 24 (1956).
163. BOWEs, op. cit. supra note 136, at 43.
164. EWING, SECOND THOUGHTS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 124 (1959).
165. ANGELL, FREE SOCIETY AND MORAL CRISIS 16 (1958). "At any given moment
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rium but it is under constant pressure from all sides-environmental
changes, new values brought by an influx of immigrants, new inventions,
or, in short, Cardozo's social needs.
It is the pressure of the needs plus the general principles already adopted
plus the general function of ethics that determines the direction of the
new ethical decisions. The needs may be blocked, the principles may be
modified, but the consequences of the decision will ultimately decide.
Accordingly, in the face of all this pressure, changes take place based on
the consequences of the proposed action. A selection is made, and the
result is a new value or a modified principle.
It should be noted that the new value has been a free choice from among
genuine alternatives. The ageless debate of freedom versus determinism
still appears in most ethical works. 166 But ethics in practice requires free-
dom to choose. The new value is not to be characterized as mere accept-
ance of what comes up-the is. We elect to do what we ought to do in
accordance with our ultimate principles.
There are other ways of describing the method by which social facts are
worked into our morality. For example, Ernest Nagel argues:
Within the framework of such a moral theory, judgments as to what ought to be
done do not follow logically from judgments as to what is actual; nevertheless,
judgments asserting what ought to be are conceived as hypotheses about ways of
resolving conflicting needs and interests.
167
This view, he says, preserves the "sharp distinction between what is and
what ought to be [and] value judgments are not thereby regarded as for-
.eign intrusions into the study of human behavior."
Another method is worked out by returning to the problem of what are
the principles we adopt and where do they come from. We can start by
saying that men want things and conditions, such as freedom. Much of
sociology today is taken up with efforts to determine what it is that men do
actually value. Further studies are devoted to discovering what men actu-
ally think they ought to want. One step further leads us to the ethical
problem of what men ought to want. But these three items are not un-
related.
The work of sociologists in the area of societal values and their origins
can barely be indicated here. Among the problems examined in this work
is whether there are any universal values for all men in all times and places,
common values in a given society for all time, or whether values are under-
the life of any society which lives by rules, legal or not, is likely to consist in a tension
between those who ...accept and voluntarily co-operate in maintaining the rules ...
and those who . . .reject the rules and attend to them only from the external point of
view as a sign of possible punishment." HART, Ti CONCEPT OF LAw 88 (1961).
166. EmN, op. cit. supra note 164, at 156; BowEs, op. cit. supra note 136, at 210.
167. Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller, 3
NATuRAL L.F. 77, 78 (1958).
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going a constant change or variation due to social forces, be they physical,
economic, or social. A combination of these possibilities must also be
included. Anthropologists and sociologists obviously must first determine
what are the values in each society. Close correlation may then reveal
common values.
But wherever the values are found, they are the cement of the society.
Men act in obedience to them or in hope of achieving them. Institutions,
laws, and cultures embody them. If the "institutions and moral norms are
adequate and compatible and behavior is guided by them," it may be said
that there is a high degree of moral integration in that society.168 In such
a society, laws would probably reflect the common values and there would
be general obedience of these laws. Again, sociologists are interested in
the factors that are conducive to a high degree of moral integration in our
complex societies.
With a high degree of moral integration or agreement on the values of
the society, it can be seen what men actually want. It should then be
possible to turn to what ought to be. This process of agreement on values
has been described as a "consensual validation of value judgments."'6 D
While this validation may take place through the rational process of form-
ing hypotheses as described by Nagel, some unanswered questions remain.
For example, why do we adopt a moral attitude toward our experience?
Bodenheimer speaks of "the evaluative impulse in human nature."170 Mrs.
Bowes is quite frank and says: "Why we must adopt this point of view is
a question that I cannot answer, and whatever mystery there is in our
doing so remains insoluble as far as I can see."
171
Toulmin, however, argues that it makes no sense within ethics to ask
whether or not we should be ethical. The test is the presence or absence
of genuine alternatives.172 The Christian can no more make an ethical
decision that four wives are better than one, than he can decide that bad
is better than good. What gives a Christian his particular values and ways
of achieving social harmony is the historical process just mentioned, but
once a Christian has his values settled to his private satisfaction, he is in
no position to evaluate his way of life with reference to that of a Moslem.
Professor Adams is really suggesting an answer when he insists that the
objective of a philosophical analysis of moral discourse is to disclose its
ontological significance. Ontology studies the nature of being and reality.
How we analyze being, what language we use with respect to it, the things
we say about it, are what determine how we regard the world and what
168. ANGELT, FrE- SocnY AND MoRAL Cnmis 8 (1958).
169. BAY, THE SmRucruRE OF FREEnDOm 8 (1958).
170. Bodenheimer, The Province of Jurisprudence, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 6 (1960).
171. Bows, op. cit. supra note 136, at 83.
172. TovLmm, op. cit. supra note 139, at 153, 162.
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is in it. For Adams, value-requiredness is clearly marked out in our
experience. Everything has an "ought-to-be."
No enlargement of this theme will be undertaken, but it is sufficient to
know that we come by our ethics much as we come by our metaphysics.
We are born into a society with characteristic ways of thinking about life
and experience. 173 Our language reflects the stage of our experience 74
and, in turn, limits the form of our reaction to that experience. Having
briefly noted the sources of principles, let us look at some of their character-
istics as seen by our selected authors.
Mrs. Bowes elaborates in considerable detail her basis for ethics. Her
conception of morality turns on her meaning of "the moral point of view."
To explain this key phrase, she says:
To adopt the point of view of morality is to act in conformity with certain very
general conceptions as to the value of human beings as individuals and as to the
sorts of human behavior that fit in with this supposed value of individuals as
persons in situations showing certain characteristic features. 17 5
We arrive at this way of looking at experience after having achieved a
certain maturity. This maturity is an essential to being able to adopt the
moral point of view. In practice, we develop a feeling or intuition of the
"fittingness" of an action, such as promise-keeping. The characteristic of
rightness is already known because we have already adopted the general
principle that if a person arouses an expectation in another, that expectation
should not be frustrated by nonfulfillment.17 6 Mrs. Bowes describes the
feature that comprises the moral fittingness of the situation as empirically
ascertainable, as she adds "in the sense that we can find it in our experi-
ence."177 But there is no absolute necessity that wherever this feature is
found that it be morally fitting. There may be situations, as also noted by
Ewing, where promise-keeping "does not fit this situation considered in
the totality of its moral aspects." All we can say is that generally promise-
keeping is demanded by the moral point of view in actual conduct. 17 8
Each of these writers has brought forward an attribute or way of regard-
173. For an anthropologist's view on this point, see BENEDICT, PArrRNS OF CU.-
TURE (1946).
174. See, e.g., the discussion of linguistic anachronisms in SmrrH, THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 214 (1912).
175. BowEs, op. cit. supra note 136, at 186.
176. Id. at 81.
177. Id. at 83.
178. Compare Toulmin: "It is inconceivable . . . that any practice will ever be
suggested, to replace promising and promise-keeping, which would be anything like
as effective. Even in the most 'advanced' stages of morality, . . . promise-keeping will
remain right." TouLmn, op. cit. supra note 139, at 150. "It is a presupposition of
the whole economic order that promises will be kept. Indeed, the matter goes
deeper. The social order rests upon stability and predictability of conduct, of which
keeping promises is a large item." Pound, Individual Interests of Substance-Promised
Advantages, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 1-2 (1945).
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ing experience which each seems ready to universalize. But even if we
accept the ultimate principle, certainly the practical application of such
a principle may take varied forms. For example, Mrs. Bowes says that we
should keep our promises because the moral point of view frowns on the
intentional raising of an expectation in another followed by an intentional
frustration of that expectation. It would be hard to demonstrate that this
principle is a universally accepted one. 179 And yet it probably represents
what is accepted in, at least, the Atlantic Community. Toulmin's function
of ethics as the correlation of "our feelings and behaviour in such a way as
to make the fulfillment of everyone's aims and desires as far as possible
compatible"'180 is bard to imagine as a leading principle among the state
leaders in Moscow. I have no intention of raising and discussing the
details involved in ethical relativism, but we cannot avoid noting that, for
all our desires, our language and our place in our particular society do fix
their mark upon us.
In contrast, it will be recalled that for Moore, our duty is "that action
which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible
alternative."181 Since we know that Moore means this literally, we must
mark off Moore's theories from those of such as Toulmin who clearly limit
a particular ethical theory to a particular society. If our emphasis, as it is,
is going to be upon the facts of the society, we should be reconciled to
not knowing all about the Universe. In our ordinary affairs we operate on
inadequate knowledge 82 and we should not therefore underwrite an ethical
theory whose requirements are beyond our powers.
One inference to be drawn from these thoughts is that ethics and juris-
prudence are studies devoted to the analysis of the means, conduct, and
law most appropriate for achieving some ultimate objective determined
outside of these two fields of learning.
It will not be denied that the burden of showing what actually are our
values and ultimate principles has been shifted to historians and sociolo-
gists. The ethical writers do not undertake either to prove their ultimate
principles or state where they come from. Pound's work of describing the
prevailing ideas of different historical periods is the reporting of one ob-
server. Moore's insistence upon the self-evidence of principles reflects this
179. The moral philosophers are agreed on the ethical propriety of promise-keeping,
but Dean Pound has described the effort to make a simple promise enforceable in
law. Pound, Individual Interest of Substance-Promised Advantages, 59 HArv. L. Rxv.
1 (1945).
180. TouLmN, op. cit. supra note 139, at 137.
181. It should, however, be noted that for Moore "personal affections and aesthetic
enjoyments include all the greatest and by far the greatest, goods we can imagine .. .
Moomx, PmicPA ETmcA 189 (1959).
182. "Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some
prophecy based on imperfect knowledge." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919). (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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idea that we know what we are without further reason.1 8 The consequence
is that we must scrutinize the conclusions of the particular thinker. There
is no agreed-upon test for determining what are the ultimate principles of
a given society at a particular time. This is not a matter for despair, but
remains the challenge.
The result of these considerations is to explain why this debate over
ethical theories never ends. Nobody has a method for demonstrating the
correctness of his own views. No matter how badly he may damage an
opponent's analysis, the writer cannot advance his own cause. The debate
must, therefore, go on. Our central theme was long ago stated in terms
that apply to both ethics and law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.184
As a result of these facts of experience, the ought judgment represents a
,conative attitude "justified and indeed imperatively required by the
facts."185
The important point to be retained from these observations is that a
community of men is held together by values and duties. Toulmin would
argue that this is so by definition. Groups of people who live together and
respect one another's interests, that is, recognize duties owing to each other
is what we mean by a community. 86 If there is not this mutual respect,
there is no community. A duty is an action which avoids giving offense to
others. The function of ethics is to coordinate these duties, "to reconcile
the independent aims and wills of a community of people,"187 or "to cor-
relate our feelings and behavior in such a way as to make the fulfillment
of everyone's aims and desires as far as possible compatible."'18 8 In this
sense, the ought is never far from the is.
IV. ErmcAL THEORY AND LEGAL PHmosoPHY
This essay began with illustrations intended to show how legal philoso-
phers and jurists inevitably move to a point where they must make norma-
tive decisions. These writers frequently make these decisions without
explaining the ethical theory upon which they found their views. It was
shown how significant for legal philosophy was the view taken by such
183. MOORE, op. cit. supra note 181, at 148.
184. HOLMES, THE COMM ON LAW 1 (1881).
185. EwNc, op. cit. supra note 164, at 77.
186. Toii.mi, op. cit. supra note 139, at 135.
187. Id. at 170.
188. Id. at 137.
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men of the nature of ethical judgments.
There was next undertaken a survey of modem ethical theory. As writ-
ten, this survey was hardly more than a surface skimming. Only the merest
indication was given of the subtlety and acuity of the linguistic analysis to
be found in the scholarly writings in this field. But certain problems were
looked at in some detail in the hope of indicating the manner in which
fruitful discussion might take place with respect to them.
With these two objectives accomplished, it remains now to tie them into
some conclusions as to the relation between ethical philosophy and legal
theory. Again, this section is merely intended to be suggestive. If it appears
to be overcrowded with undeveloped topics it should also be recognized
that the subject is capable of a vast expansion in both width and depth.
Certain conclusions will be reached which, it is trusted, are in accord with
our findings on similar problems in ethical theory. In the course of perusing
this statement, it should have been apparent that the issues considered here
have not been given close attention by very many writers in either field.
In order to get the basic problem before us, the first issue to be looked
at will be the relation between law and morals. Dean Pound, as we shall
see, has eruditely traced the historical ebb and flow of this relationship.
Today, however, we seem to be in a more critical mood and the nature of
the precise issues involved have been given careful attention by such
analytical writers as H. L. A. Hart. It will become apparent in this discus-
sion that a matter of definitions is involved and we shall indicate the nature
of some of the efforts to distinguish law and morals or, if you will, jurispru-
dence and ethics. As a final issue, there will be examined some current
controversies in legal theory upon which our previous discussion of ethical
philosophy has some relevance. As can be seen, this is a large order but it
is hoped that a reader will be at least impressed by the pertinence and
interrelationships of much of the material thus far presented.
Accordingly, we shall turn first to examine some theories on the proper
relationship between law and morals. This problem has been handled best
by Dean Pound. 89 As usual, he finds four distinct views: the historical,
the philosophical, the analytical, and the sociological.
The historical school of the nineteenth century strove to describe the
chronological development of the law. According to Pound, the writers of
this school generally recognized "four stages in the development of law
with respect to morality and morals."
First, is the stage of undifferentiated ethical customs, customs of popular action,
religion, and law .... Second, is the stage of strict law, codified or crystallized
custom, which in time is outstripped by morality and does not possess sufficient
power of growth to keep abreast. Third, there is a stage of infusion of morality
189. Pound, Law and Morals-Jurisprudence and Ethics, 23 N.C.L. REv. 185 (1945).
Morals, for him, refers to "systems of precepts as to conduct organized by principles as
ideal systems." Ibid. Compare PouND, LAw AND MORAuS (2d ed. 1926).
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into the law and of reshaping it by morals; what I have called in another connec-
tion the stage of equity and natural law. Fourth, there is the stage of conscious
lawmaking, the maturity of law, in which it is said that morals and morality are
for the lawmaker and that law alone is for the judge.190
Pound promptly pointed out that the division of function between
legislator and judge failed in practice and the judge had to make moral
determinations "whenever a legal precept has to be found in order to meet
what used to be called a 'gap in the law'...." At such times the precept
"is found by choice of a starting point which is governed by considering
how far application of the result reached from one or the other will comport
with the received ideal."191
The philosophical view grew out of the attempts of the natural law
jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to equate law and
morals, to make moral precepts identical with legal precepts. These jurists
argued that a legal precept was not binding unless it was a moral precept.
This theory had its usefulness in liberalizing the law and bringing it into
some conformity with moral principles, but, as Pound notes, "the theory is
tolerable practically only at a time when absolute ideas of morals pre-
vail."192 But in an era "when all absolute theories are discarded and no
authorities are recognized, when moreover, classes with divergent interests
hold diverse views on fundamental points . . . ," then such a view is
impossible lest every man make his own law.
The nineteenth century philosophers got out of this position by finding
an ultimate principle of justice from which they deduced both morals and
law. They confined morals to prescribing motives for conduct and law was
left to account for the outward results of conduct. This allowed the infer-
ence that jurisprudence was subordinate to ethics. Jellinek in 1878. con-
cluded that law was a minimum ethics, 193 that part of morals indispensable
for a social order. It may be noted that this minimizing of law was in
accord with nineteenth century individualism and the minimizing of gov-
ernment.
In Pound's opinion, the analytical view was primarily English in origin.
The separation of law and morals was influenced by one of the basic
premises of eighteenth century English political theory, the separation of
powers. Law and morals were not only separate; they were unrelated.
Where they touched in practice, it was a faulty section in the actual
governmental structure. The judge was expected to confine himself to law
even though his ordinary duties clearly required him to make choices that
were necessarily of a moral nature. "In truth, there are continual points
of contact with morals at every turn in the ordinary course of the judical
190. Pound, supra note 189, at 187.
191. Id. at 188.
192. Id. at 190.
193. Id. at 193.
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process. A theory which ignores them, or pictures them as few and of
little significance, is not a theory of the actual law in action."194
These latter remarks seem so commonplace as to cause Pound to examine
the nature of the considerations that could have led the entire analytical
school so far afield. He found the answer in-the definitions used by this
school. "[I]t is said that morals have to do with thought and feeling, while
the law has to do only with acts; that in ethics we aim at perfecting the
individual character of men, while law seeks only to regulate the relations of
individuals with each other and with the state.... Next, it is said that as
between external and internal observance of the dictates of morals the law
has to do with the former only."19
Pound argues that these divisions were never, and could never be,
strictly applied in practice. But he does not take an extreme view. He
says that "it is equally a mistake wholly to divorce law and morals, as the
analytical jurists sought to do, and wholly to identify them as the natural-
law jurists sought to do."196
There are some situations where for the general security we just need
uniform rules. There are other situations in which "the law does not
approve many things which it does not expressly condemn." 9 7 And thirdly,
law has to deal with incidence of loss where both parties are morally
blameless."'198
Pound's fourth view is the sociological one and here we approach a view
more compatible with the prevailing spirit of our times. Law and morals
are both forms of social control. There are many forms of such control.
"It is important for the jurist to bear in mind, what the sociologists insist
upon, that the inner order of groups and associations other than the political
organization of a society, and religious and philosophical ideals play a
194. Id. at 206.
195. Id. at 207-08. "Though much ground is common to both, the subject-matter
of Law and of Ethics is not the same. The field of legal rules of conduct does not
coincide with that of moral rules, and is not included in it; and the purposes for which
they exist are distinct. Law does not aim at perfecting the individual character of men,
but at regulating the relations of citizens to the commonwealth and to one another."
PoLLocK, A FrosT BooK OF JUaISPRUDENC E 46 (6th ed. 1929). "Besides and beyond
the limitation of the field of law to external conduct, there are many actions and
kinds of conduct condemned by morality which for various reasons law can either not
deal with at all or can deal with only in an incidental and indirect manner." Id. at 48.
"The moral sciences having thus been grouped under the head of Ethic, in which the
object of investigation is the conformity of the will to a rule; and of Nomology, in
which the object of investigation is the conformity of acts to a rule, we pass by the
former as foreign to our subject, and confine our attention to the latter." HoLLAND,
JuBisPr DENcE 28 (13th ed. 1924). As we shall see, this distinction still has vitality.
See note 221 infra.
196. Pound, supra note 189, at 212.
197. For elaboration see Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 3 A.B.A.J.
55 (1917).
198. Pound, supra note 189, at 213.
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large and often controlling part in the ordering of society in comparison
with law in the lawyer's sense."19
Pound observes that "morals grow ahead of both law and morality." The
reason for this appears to lie in ethics being more responsive to changes in
society. New situations, economic, political, or ideological, demand answers
that ethics gives. But law and moral customs with their" important need for
stability and continuity, lag and change only under pressure.
Pound himself takes a large view of society and finds a necessity for
maintaining a balance between "(1) justice, the ideal relation between
men, (2) morals, the ideal development of individual character; and (3)
security."200 These factors are not mutually exclusive. All three weigh upon
and influence each other; each has its role; and each presents its problems.
Theoretical purity is out of place here because jurisprudence is a practical
science.
Pound's conclusion that law and morals are separate but equal forms
of social control leads us towards the necessity of considering more precisely
the distinction between law and morals. First, however, let us tarry a
moment on an exceptionally fine article by an English writer, H. L. A.
Hart, which appeared several years ago in the Harvard Law Review.201
Hart queries whether there is a point of intersection of law and morals
and what it could mean to say that the is and the ought are fused and
inseparable. Defending Austin and Bentham, he insists that they recognized
the extent of the historical influence of moral opinion so that many legal
rules "mirrored moral rules or principles."202 But their persistent theme was
that "it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards
of morality that it was not a rule of law; and, conversely, it could not follow
from the mere fact that a rule was morally desirable that it was a rule of
law."203
Hart separates three issues of this general problem: (1) With respect to
a particular law there is no difficulty in distinguishing what is the law and
what ought to be but (2) the problem arises when "we examine how laws,
the meanings of which are in dispute, are interpreted and applied in con-
crete cases" and (3) again, when we ask "not whether every particular rule
of law must satisfy a moral minimum to be a law, but whether a system
of rules which altogether failed to do this could be a legal system."204
There is a hard core of existing legal rules in any legal system but the
normal course of litigation brings up the penumbral situations which do
199. Id. at 221.
200. Id. at 222.
201. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 H~nv. L. REV.
593 (1958).
202. Id. at 598.
203. Id. at 599.
204. Id. at 601.
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not clearly fit into any existing rule. In such situations the questions arise
whether the judge does not reach his decision by making a choice as to
what ought to be in terms, say, of social utility and is this not a moral
judgment? The answer is in the affirmative only if it is assumed that lav
and morals are the same. This is not so because all choices are not moral.
'The judge in making a choice for good reason and according to stated
standards is acting rationally but not necessarily morally. His rational
decisions are intended to be in accordance with the law even though the
result, to the moralist, may be evil. According to Hart, all that needs to be
.done is that "we must decide the penumbral cases rationally by reference
to social aims."205 It is a mistake, however, to become preoccupied with
the penumbra. Those who fuse law and morals tend to make this mistake.
But no new judicial effort is required with the solid core of precedents
whose position is fixed regardless of morals.
Hart now turns to consider whether a legal system must contain an
inherent morality if it is to be called a legal system. He concedes that a
minimum coincidence of law and morality is necessary for survival. Murder,
theft, and the like must be barred but little more and certainly nowhere
near the extent suggested by the usual natural law theory.2°G
The same results are reached regardless of what ethical system is as-
sumed. A noncognitive emotive theory would, of course, support the com-
plete separation of law and morals. But so can a cognitive theory. Hart
argues that from the nature of an ethical judgment there is no inference to
*be made as to its relationship to law. But he does add that a cognitive
theory would enable a moralist to demonstrate rationally the iniquity of
particular laws and the desirability of revision of such laws.
20 7
Even if Hart finds it unnecessary in this one article to make any decisions
.on the nature of ethics, it does seem clear that sooner or later any student
in this field must formulate his own definitions of law and morals and the
relationship between the two, if any. Those who would mingle the two
concepts have much explaining to do.
Hart has not shirked this problem. A brief notice of his thoughts on the
.distinctions between legal and moral obligation will prepare us for a
consideration of the type of definition of law towards which this essay has
'been moving.
His article208 has the deceptively simple theme of why people obey laws.
205. Id. at 614.
206. "[I]n all moral codes there will be found some form of prohibition of the use
of violence, to persons or things, and requirements of truthfulness, fair dealing, and
respect for promises. These things . . . can be seen . . . to be essential if human
-beings are to live continuously together in close proximity." HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAw 176 (1961).
207. Id. at 626.




Hart rejects the idea that people so act solely out of a habit of obedience
or because of a recognition of a moral obligation to do so. Obedience to
law is a complex social practice even in the simplest of societies. It consists
of a number of factors. There is a general obedience but in order to account
for a legal obligation there is also an understanding that the leader X's
"words should generally be accepted as constituting a standard of behavior
so that deviations from it ...are treated as occasions for criticisms of
various sorts ...." and further, "that references to X's words are generally
made as reasons for doing or having done what X says, as supporting
demands that others should do what he says, and as rendering at least
permissible the application of coercive repressive measures to persons who
deviate from the standard constituted by X's words." 09 All this is necessary
to support on equal terms both legal rules and conclusions drawn from
these rules. There is here obviously no mere habit of obedience and, it
cannot be denied, no moral obligation to obey. The belief in such a moral
obligation would no doubt be extremely helpful but, in Hart's view, is not
essential. There are many reasons why there should be a general obedience
to the law, but the point at issue is the factual one of the existence of a
legal system and that is sufficiently accounted for by the existence of the
social practice previously described.
Following this description of a legal obligation, we may now examine
the features of a moral obligation that make it quite distinct from a legal
one. First, a moral obligation is dependent upon the actual long-continued
practice of the social group. It is, of course, possible to create by fiat a new
legal obligation. Second, a moral obligation may exist independent of the
content of the obligation. Promise-keeping is the best example of this
feature. We are obligated to keep our promises regardless of their content.
We obey laws according to their content. Finally, the nature of the coercion
available to enforce moral obligation is quite different from that which is
used for breaches of legal duties. Moral obligation is encouraged and
enforced primarily by reminders and criticism, shame and exhortation.
Hart makes an important issue of this point. He argues that "as soon as an
appeal is made primarily to fear even of unorganized 'sanctions,' we are on
the way from moral to legal obligation."210 He then adds a comment which,
as we shall see, is a significant one for an English legal philosopher:
The fact that moral pressure is characteristically exerted through an appeal to the
delinquent's assumed respect for the institution violated, together with the fact
that the plea, "I could not help it," is, if substantiated, always an excuse, jointly
constitute the "internality" of morals as compared with the "externality" of law.
This has sometimes been grossly misrepresented by the contention that whereas
laws require us to do certain actions morals only require us to be in certain states
of mind (or soul).2 11
209. Id. at 90.




These views of Hart open up some questions that we are considering in
this section of the essay. The emphasis upon actual social practices is
-compatible with the previous discussion. Hart's distinctions, however, show
that we must turn to the problem of definitions, and this in our next query.
With the continuing interest in linguistics among English legal philoso-
phers, it is easy to get into a protracted discussion about definitions.
212
We can argue that the meanings of words are arbitrary or fixed. Professor
Williams shows the impossibility of arguing for the latter and, it seems to
:me, that the former view cannot be true either. We can shun "the false
idea that reality follows grammatical form,"2 13 but no one need go as far as
to say that
the word "law" is simply a symbol for an idea. This idea may vary with the
person who uses the word .... Everyone is entitled for his own part to use words
in any meaning he pleases; there is no such thing as an intrinsically "proper" or
"improper" meaning of a word.214
For the present, we want meanings, not only for "law" but also for
.1morals." And these meanings will have to be of some significance, if all
that has gone before in this essay is to have any significance. The defini-
tions, in short, must be useful. There are many possible meanings of mean-
ing, 15 but, without argument, it seems wise to go along with Felix Cohen
that "usefulness rather than truth... is the only standard by which a verbal
.definition can be judged."2 16
Our purpose then is to decide upon useful definitions of law and morals.
-We are about ready to assert that jurisprudence and ethics serve different
functions and have different objectives. These objectives can, and do, at
times overlap, for example, when the idea of fairness is introduced into
the law. But it must be admitted that morally desirable objectives may
stand apart from the law, waiting for an introduction, but, because of
problems unique to the law, sometimes waiting vainly.217 We turn now to
the method of arriving at a useful definition.
Professor Hart suggests that we do not attempt to define legal words.
The correct procedure is to take a sentence in which the word plays a
characteristic role ("X has a right") and then explain the word "first by
specifying the conditions under which the whole sentence is true, and
secondly by showing how it [the word] is used in drawing a conclusion
212. See the series of articles by Glanville Williams, Language and the Law, 61
L.Q. REv. 71, 179, 293, 384 (1945).
213. Id. at 303.
214. Williams, International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word "Law,"
22 Bart. YB. INT1'L L. 146, 163 (1945).
215. Sixteen are listed in OGDEN & RicAws, ThE MEANING OF MEANING 186-87
(1923).
216. Cohen, ETHICAL SYsTEMs AND LEGAL IDEALS 13 (1959).
217. See the urging of the introduction into the law of a moral obligation in Prof.
Seavey's comment, I Am Not My Guest's Keeper, 13 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1960).
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from the rules in a particular case." As an example the above sentence is
-true if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) There is in existence a legal system.
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some other person Y is, in the events which
have happened, obliged to do or abstain from some action.
(c) This obligation is made by law dependent on the choice either of X or some
other person authorized to act on his behalf so that either Y is bound to do
or abstain from some action only if X ... so chooses or alternatively only
until X . . . chooses otherwise. [Further,) ...a statement of the form "X
has a right" is used to draw a conclusion of law in a particular case which falls
under such rules.218
He concludes with "the cardinal principle that legal words can only be
elucidated by considering the conditions under which statements in which
they have their characteristic use are true."2 19
This conceptual pragmatism is followed by Kantorowicz when he says
that "we must choose the most fruitful among several linguistically possible
-definitions of a term denoting a thing, before we can examine and demon-
strate the truth of any ...assertion regarding the thing denoted. m 0
Following this premise, the author gives his definition of law as "a body
of rules prescribing external conduct and considered justiciable."22l After
considering the elements of this definition, he admits that "the first question
-which presents itself concerns the distinction between legal and moral
rules. ... . The best-known distinction is the one ... : law is concerned
with external conduct, morals with internal." The author believes that this
distinction means that "all the various ethical systems prescribe internal
conduct consisting of volitions, and deem the resulting inner attitudes
virtuous . . . , whereas the rules of law never prescribes internal conduct,
either good faith, due care, or the will to forbear committing a crime....
What the law really prescribes is .. .nothing but external conduct, i.e.,
certain movements of the human body, . . . or the forbearance from
performing such movements. These movements must as a rule be capable
of being performed consciously and voluntarily, but in certain circum-
stances the conduct may be mechanical and unconscious without losing its
legal significance." To say it another way: "All systems of morals . . .
require some kind of motive, or at least some kind of consciousness
accompanying, the prescribed acts, or even treat this internal conduct as
sufficient without requiring any kind of external manifestation of the will.
But in law a person may act from the meanest, or at least from a purely
selfish, motive and yet comply with his legal duties ... ."222 It is Kan-
218. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REv. 37, 49 (1954).
219. Id. at 59-60. Compare Prof. Adams' definition of ethical words in terms of their
use at text accompanying note 111 supra.
220. KANToRowicz, Tim DEFINITION OF LAW 9 (1958).
221. Id. at 21.
222. Id. at 41-47.
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torowicz's conclusion that "the prevailing theory contrasting law and morals
as externally and internally binding forces has stood the test of useful-
ness."2
Before deciding upon our agreement with the author, some other points
he makes should be noticed. While arguing that, in their essence, law and
morals are distinct, nevertheless it is true that the two can intersect. What
is called "quasi-morality" is defined by Kantorowicz as "a purely external
conduct which as to its content complies with moral rules and which
therefore would be moral if it were dictated by a good motive." The signifi-
cance of this term is that quasi-morality is "all that can be achieved by
social reform, practical politics and the pressure of public opinion," that is,
external conduct can be coerced but genuine morality is something else.
Another point made by Kantorowicz is contrary to a position stoutly
maintained by Hart. Kantorowicz believes that there is a moral obligation
to obey the law. He argues that "if selfish motives, e.g., fear of the regular
enforcement of the law, were the only ones to recommend its observance,
there would be so many ready to take the chance of its nonenforcement
that there would soon be no enforcement at all."2
24
As previously mentioned, 2s this distinction between law and morals has
been a part of English jurisprudence for about a century. There are
serious objections to it which we will review prior to deciding how fatal
they are to the distinction. The first objection to be noted is that most
ethical writers do not seem to believe that their work is intended only
to affect inner attitudes. The previous discussion must surely have made it
evident that they are constantly talking of conduct.
Not only moral philosophers, but legal philosophers also, will be dis-
satisfied with this distinguishing of law and ethics. Pound, for instance,
would deny it as a matter of fact. Law is very much concerned with
motivation and moral attitudes in judicial rulings. An act done for a
malicious motive can convert a lawful act into an unlawful act.226 Pound
also points to the sticky point of wilful inaction on X's part in the presence
of mortal danger to Y. This Good Samaritan situation has been under attack
for years with steadily growing insistence that a failure to act may be
actionable2 7 Even when we recognize that the problem is one of what
223. Id. at 50. Of this theory, Prof. H. L. A. Hart remarks that it "really amounts to
the surprising assertion that legal and moral rules properly understood could not ever
have the same content; and though it does contain a hint of the truth it is, as it stands,
profoundly misleading." HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 168 (1961).
224. Ibid.
225. See note 195 supra.
226. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909); Ames, How Far an
Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HAnv. L. Rnv.
411 (1905).




courts can do about proof and such issues, nevertheless, the law on this
particular point is moving steadily to the point where what is now only
morally required will in the future, become part of the legal code of our
society.
We are really treating here of points of intersection of law and morals.
We have earlier noted how Pound thought it was just as wrong to divorce
law and morals as it was to equate them.2 He, of course, has his defini-
tions. Morality is a body of conduct according to accepted standards.
Morals, which Pound seems to equate with ethics, is a system of precepts
as to conduct organized by principles into an ideal system. "Systems of
morals are likely to be in the main idealizings of the morality of the time
and place."2 Morals then become the ideal development of individual
character. "What are faults in morals may or may not manifest themselves
in tangible infractions of the ideal relation among men, and so may be out
of the sphere of the legal adjustment of relations and ordering of con-
duct."23o
Law for Pound is, of course, a complex concept. It can stand for the
legal order itself, the judicial and administrative processes, or the body of
authoritative grounds of or guides to judicial decision and administrative
action.2 31 The dean describes his sociological jurisprudence as the "study
of the system of law functionally as a part or phase of social control, and
of its institutions and doctrines with respect to the social ends to be
served."
232
The sociologist has tended to use the term law to include both morals
and law on the understanding that both are forms of social control. For
our purpose, however, this may lead to confusion. Let us understand, there-
fore, that these are two distinct areas of learning with separate ends,
functions, or purposes.
This distinction can also be arrived at by our earlier assumptions (1)
that ethical conduct is that which is in accord with the established ultimate
ethical principles and (2) that these principles in sum indicate the function
of ethics or what is to be expected of ethical conduct. These assumptions
lead to the inference that there is no such entity as goodness. 233 There are
228. See text accompanying note 196 supra. "In all communities there is a partial
overlap in content between legal and moral obligation; though the requirements of
legal rules are more specific and are hedged round with more detailed exceptions than
their moral counterparts." HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 166 (1961).
229. Pound, supra note 227, at 186.
230. PoUND, JUsTncE Acco~iNG TO LAW 7 (1951). H. L. A. Hart complicates the
problem by distinguishing social morality from personal morality. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAw 163 (1961).
231. POUND, OUTrIuES OF JURIsPRUDENCE 76-77 (5th ed. 1943).
232. Id. at 4.
233. Hence, the significance of Prof. Williams' remark on "the false idea that reality




only good acts which are such acts as fulfil the function of ethics. This
view led to our agreement with Santayana's objection to the hypostatization.
or reification of ethics.m
By the same argument, there is no objective characteristic known as
justice. There are only just acts which fulfil the function of justice or law.
We are returned then to the determination of the unique functions of ethics
and law. They serve different social purposes. Dean Pound is one of the
few writers who has followed this approach.
Pound concludes that in the four tasks of (1) making of rules of law
and finding grounds of decision, (2) interpreting rules, (3) applying rules
and grounds of decision, and (4) exercising of discretion in the judicial
and in the administrative process, three things are to be regarded: "(1)
justice, the ideal relation between men; (2) morals, the ideal development
of individual character; and (3) security. These three have to be kept in
balance."23
It follows that in decisions law and morals will intersect in varying de-
grees. The factors to be considered will be the usual ones. Morals will
press its claims to be balanced against the practical limitations of effective
legal action and the general security in giving predictability and continuity
to transactions. It is pertinent to point out, that this view is a completely
rational one. The good reasons for the converging claims may be martialled,
debated, and put into effect in a thoroughly rational procedure. The ethical
approach of Cohen, Bowes, Ewing, Kimpel, and Toulmin are of relevance
in this effort. Moore and Stevenson provide as little assistance as does
Kelsen in moving rationally in this area.
Felix Cohen has developed in some detail these particular points. He
states that "by the term law we shall mean a body of rules according to
which the courts... decide cases."236 In this definition, there is no conno-
tation of approval or disapproval, "law is law, whether it be good or bad,
and only on the admission of this platitude can a meaningful discussion
of the goodness and badness of law rest."
Ethics, for Cohen, is "the science of the significance and application of
judgments of good, bad, right, wrong .... ." Moral philosophy is "that
branch of ethics which is concerned with voluntary human activity. 2 37 By
these definitions, it would appear that the goodness or badness of both law
and morals are determined by ethics. This is permissible if, as with
Cohen, the ends of both are the same. Both law and morals are intended to
affect human conduct so as to promote good human activity or the good
life. Without denying this ultimate purpose, we have already assigned to
234. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
235. Pound, supra note 227, at 222. See also PouND, ThE IDEAL ELE MENT IN LAv
82 (1958).
236. Cohen, ETmCAL SysTEms AND LEGAL IDEALS 11 (1959).
2,37. Id. at 15-16.
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law and morals certain distinct and unique ideals. This would not seem
to be precluded by Cohen's analysis.m
This distinction between the function of ethics and the function of law
is actually one in general use. It is not uncommon to hear a statement
to the effect that "X has no legal duty to do act A, but he does have a moral
obligation to do it." Another form of this same distinction may be illustrated
from a sentence in a recent article by Julius Stone:
The essence of the rule of law ideal lies . .. not in 'law" narrowly defined, but
rather in the supremacy of certain ethical convictions, certain rules of decency
prevalent in the community, and in the fact that those who are at the apex of
power share those convictions and feel bound to conform to them. A9
Literally, this opinion puts ethical judgments in a controlling position.
However, in accordance with the position here set forth, the rule of law
ideal should be governed by principles of justice evolved to set forth the.
ideal relations of men in society and would have no necessary connection
with how men conducted themselves in their personal life. Decency does
not seem to be an appropriate word in discussing the rule of law or, at
least in Professor Hart's phrase, it is not a characteristic use of the word.
No better discussion of the issues on this point can be found than in the
debate in the Harvard Law Review several years ago between Professors
Hart and Fuller.24° But this same issue appears in varied forms. The trial
of Adolf Eichmann is the same issue in its purest form. Eichmann admitted
that, in his heart, he was guilty of murder but argued that he was not
guilty in the legal sense, meaning that he simply carried out orders to
perform these acts. He performed this duty under the threat of his own
death. He could not get transferred from this job. The sole alternative left
to him was suicide.2341 Assuming the factual truth behind this argument,
Eichmann could be held legally responsible only if a moral law overrides a
law that is unjust. The question for the philosopher is how we discover
such a moral law. The moral law has to have priority in time over the
unjust statute. Sidney Hook has argued why this must be so by saying that
a moral law does not imply the existence of a lawgiver. We can derive a moral
law from a lawgiver only if the lawgiver is moral. To know that he is, we would
already have to possess prior knowledge of moral law independent of his existence.
238. This opinion is advanced despite Cohen's remarks, id. at 25-26.
239. Stone, Law, Force and Survival, 1961 FoRmN AFFAiRs 549.
240. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAv. L. REv. 593
(1958); Fuller, Positivism and the Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HAuv. L. Rlv. 630 (1958).
241. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1961, p. 1, col. 1. A 1950 Israeli statute rules out the
defense of superior orders except as ground for mitigation. The statute contemplates
a retroactive effect. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1961, p. 4, col. 1. For a sampling of the
issues raised by the Eichmann capture and trial see Silving, In re Eichmann: A Dilemma
of Law and Morality, 55 Am. J. INTL L. 307 (1961); Baade, The Eichmann Trial:
Some Legal Aspects, 1961 D=nx L.J. 400.
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If the enforcement of legal obligations bad no reference to moral obligation, how
could we condemn the infamous laws of Hitler and Khruscbev, or punish Eichmann
and his spiritual kinsmen for executing their legal orders?
242
The question Professor Hook asks is, of course, precisely the one at issue.
The methods of modem philosophy provide no method of reaching this
pre-existing moral law. It is not "a brooding omnipresence in the sky,
' '2 43
but, as this essay has attempted to show, is a set of rules derived from the
principles that hold the society together. These principles are in this view
not apart from any society but are so closely related to the social facts and
peculiarities of that society as to be uniquely related to it and not to any
other society.
We have previously noted that legal philosophers in the course of
developing their views have, almost without argument, adopted particular
ethical philosophies. Kelsen's view of the irrationality of ethical concepts
is an important aspect of his Pure Theory. Fuller's opinion of the content
of modem ethics has thus far precluded his effective use of possible con-
tributions from ethical theory. Dean Pound early arrived at the opinion
that the function of law was to satisfy interests. He spent much time in
classifying the types of interests. Implicit in this arrangement is the crite-
rion that consequences are the test of the efficacy of law. The ideal legal
arrangement was the maximum satisfaction of interests. But while he spoke
much of morals, he never seriously worked this field, his many bibliog-
raphies show no grasp of the field of ethics, and we are left with only the
dictum that ethics and law are both forms of social control.
The previous few pages have shown that students have always noted
some relationship between law and morals but like most ideas, this relation-
ship has had a history of ebb and flow. In the past, the effort has been in
the direction of emphasizing one or the other. It appears that only recently
has it been argued that law and ethics are separate but related fields, each
with its own functions. It is here argued that the similarity in conceptual
structure is most marked and each has something to contribute to the other.
This similarity is emphasized when we find a problem being vigorously
debated, such as the nature of legal principles, with no apparent realization
that it is but one form of a larger problem and that in ethics, every student
who writes in the field, sooner or later considers the problem of the nature
of ethical principles.
Not only can problems in the two fields be attacked by the same methods
but it should also be realized that problems in jurisprudence and ethics are
also dependent upon conclusions reached elsewhere. We have endeavored
to point out where appropriate how differences in ethics were brought about
242. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1961, Book Rev. Section, p. 35.
243. "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate
voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified .... Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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by metaphysical or epistemological beliefs. Not many legal philosophers
in America have stressed these larger studies. F. S. C. Northrop and
Thomas Cowan are two who do today. Kelsen's philosophical background
is such that an American student is in almost no position at all to appreciate
Kelsen's legal work.
In this past section, we have traced the relations of law and morals.
Emphasizing the modem view, we have now concluded that these two areas
of learning-jurisprudence and ethics-represent distinct efforts to achieve
values in society. They have their own needs and claims., They are not in
any necessary conflict and do, frequently, intersect. Certainly it should be
clear that the methods of studying and talking about both fields are quite
similar, if not actually identical. Both must be considered rationally; both
have close associations with the empirical facts of social living. Before
concluding this essay, we shall turn to two problems very much alive
in legal circles today and show how significant are the contributions that
may be made by students of ethical theory to these problems.
As this is being written there is a widening controversy going on in our
law reviews as to the nature of the principles that ought to govern the
adjudications of constitutional issues that come before the Supreme Court.
The issue is simply what are good reasons in constitutional law. Although
other areas of scholarship are being introduced by the later articles in this
debate, I have not yet seen any reference to Toulmin nor, indeed, to any
of these writers whose thoughts we have been discussing in spite of their
obvious relevance.
The nature of our constitutional system has, of , course, been a subject
of continuing interest throughout our history. The recent flareup grew out
of two articles in the Harvard Law Review several years ago.244 One of
the authors, Professor Wechsler, has issued a call for "reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is in-
volved."245 Only such reasons, he says, should be the basis of constitutional
decisions and the "virtue or demerit of a judgment turns ... entirely', on
the reasons that support it and their adequacy to maintain any choice of
values it decrees.'2
The introduction by such an authority of a novel expression like "neutral
principles" aroused considerable comment. The real problem has -become
to decide what the expression meant. It can be accepted that a principle
ought to be larger than the immediate case. That is what is meant, by a
general principle; it is intended to hold good for a class of cases. A judge
deciding on constitutional issues is making a choice on what ought t6"be.
244. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1959); Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HAiv. L. REV. 84 (1959).
245. Wechsler, supra note 244, at 19.
246. Id. at 19-20.
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He must decide what ought to be included as significant factors in his
decision. He cannot hope to decide each case as though it were unique.
He must compare, analogize, and generalize.
The argument that one makes a choice in making a decision appears to,
be arguing about a tautology. Evidence of alternative choices across the
board in scholarship is worth demonstrating247 but it finally seems cumula-
tive. However, the point argued is basic. Two conclusions may be made,
on the issue of choice in judicial decision and they have, of course, been
made: (1) "The question is not whether the Justices .. .followed neutral
principles, but rather what value preferences did they espouse,' M and (2)
"today there is . . . need for more conscious normation on the part of the
members of the Court."2 49
The two writers here being quoted come out for what they call "teleo-
logical jurisprudence," which would be "purposive in nature." Their basis
for this apparent invention is that "any reference to neutral or impersonal
principles is . . . little more than a call for a return to a mechanistic
jurisprudence and for a jurisprudence of nondisclosure as well as an
attempted denial of the teleological aspects of any decision, wherever
made."2s This is slightly extravagant, assuming that Professor Wechsler
really has some meaning for neutral principles. His words are the cause of
all the writing and yet the articles written in opposition are striking at
views which do not appear to be his. He writes, just as his apparent
opponents do, that "courts in constitutional determinations face issues that
are inescapably 'Political'... in that they involve a choice among competing
values or desires, a choice reflected in the legislative or executive action in
question, which the court must either condemn or condone."251
The choice, as he constantly says, as though to undo what he has said,
must be in terms of "reasons that in their generality and neutrality tran-
scend any immediate result that is involved." One cannot avoid wondering
how a neutral principle can be used in a value choice. We get no answer,
only another question as he now asks: "[I]s not the relative compulsion of
the language of the Constitution, of history and precedent... itself a matter
to be judged, so far as possible by neutral principles-by standards that
transcend the case at hand?"252
If "neutral" means more than "general perhaps we can get assistance
by considering another term recently introduced by Dean Griswold of
Harvard Law School. The dean has entered the debate and has issued his
247. It is well done in Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661 (1960).
248. Id. at 675.
249. Id. at 689.
250. Id. at 671.
251. Wechsler, supra note 244, at 15. He also speaks of "the basic values of a free
society." Id. at 19.
252. Id. at 17.
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warnings against decisions that are excessively "result oriented."253 His
reasons for avoiding concern about the result of the particular case are
that " long human experience has shown that where there is interest there
is not likely to be independence of judgment; and interest for this purpose
is much broader than mere personal or financial responsibility."254
He concludes by asking that decisions be reached "on intellectually valid
and disinterested grounds." There is, thus, substantial agreement that
principles express values, should be general, and should result from a
reflection upon the complex of issues involved in the particular circum-
stances. 2 55
After the above comments were written, Professor Wechsler made it clear
that (1) the various guesses as to his meaning were in error and (2) he
wasn't going to help clarify matters. His comment was:
Some of those who heard or read "Toward Neutral Principles" have doubted
whether "neutral" is the proper word to designate the quality I have in mind or
whether its intended meaning is made clear.
As to the choice of adjective, my case is simply that I could discover none that
better serves my purpose. Neither "impartial," nor "disinterested," nor "imper-
sonal," the main alternatives that I considered, seems to me as adequate in its
expression; and to rest on "general," though the idea is certainly included, is to
give up overtones that I intend. That those overtones are somewhat enigmatic in
their content is not, from my point of view, a real deficiency; this is an enigmatic
subject.
As to my meaning, I must rest upon the paper to provide the necessary exegesis,
but explicit statement on one point may be of aid. In calling for neutrality of
principle, I certainly do not deny that constitutional provisions are directed to
protecting certain special values or that the principled development of a particular
provision is concerned with the value or the values thus involved. The demand of
neutrality is that a value and its measure be determined by a general analysis
that gives no weight to accidents of application, finding a scope that is acceptable
whatever interest, group, or person mayiassert tlielaim.i= -
It is submitted that this entire discussion is similar to that met in almost
any book of modem ethics. The considerations set forth earlier on the
place and functions of principles in ethics 257 have complete relevance
here. Professor Wechsler is not, whatever "neutral" means, asking for
253. Griswold, The Supreme Court 1959 Term, Foreward: Of Time and Attitudes-
Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HxAv. L. 11Ev. 81, 91 (1960).
254. Ibid.
255. It is assumed "that what Professor Wechsler chiefly seeks is a method of adjudi-
cation which is disinterested, reasoned, and comprehensive of the full range of like
constitutional issues, coupled with a method of judicial exposition which plainly and
fully articulates the real bases of decision." Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judi-
cial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1, 32 (1959). But
the author promptly confesses that he doesn't really know exactly what "neutral"
means.
256. WECHSLER, PRuClI'LES, POLriCS, AND FUNDAmENTAL LAw at xiii-xiv (1961).
The real enigma is why anyone should be so proudly and defiantly enigmatic.
257. Hart, supra note 147, at 593.
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anything but a determination and refinement of the basic principles in our
Scoistitutional law. If this is so, it is astonishing that a great nation should
be guided by principles that are "enigmatic."
In similar fashion we have noted two authors who felt that "neutrar'
must mean something like "devoid of values."258 Their sharp reaction was,
instead, to demand a "teleological jurisprudence" which would openly
avow the values being espoused. Again, it is believed to be clear that a
deontological ethics corresponds to a mechanistic jurisprudence just as a
teleological ethics is the analogue of a teleological jurisprudence.2- Again
we have an obvious parallel between theories of law and ethics. We can
even pursue this further.
The proposed teleological jurisprudence requires that we establish ends.
Legal principles are to be tested by the manner in which they further these
ends. While Wechsler recognized the existence of societal values, he was
intent upon a methodological problem and apparently was content to call
for his neutral principles and made no attempt to flesh them out. Even
those who called for this purposive legal philosophy do not tell us what
the ultimate end is to be. In speaking of the Court, it is asserted that
alternatives of choice are to be considered, not so much in terms of who the liti-
gants are or what the issue is, but rather in terms of the realization or non-realiza-
tion of stated societal values. What these values might be, we do not now set
forth.26 0
So the work is yet to be done, as we found in ethics.
As soon as good reasons for choice in ethics or constitutional law no
longer turn solely upon adherence to pre-existing principles, but are de-
pendent upon an accord between the consequences of action and some end,
we must consider the details of the end. This has not been done by many
legal writers.
Toulmin believes that we can answer the question, "Is this the right thing
to do?", only with reference to a discussion of social practices which are
genuine alternatives within one society.261 As has been seen, he argues that
it makes no sense for a Christian and a Moslem to argue about whether
it is better to have four wives. That argument would actually turn upon a
personal preference for a way of life.
But within the confines of one given society, e.g., our own, we can now
ask questions like, "Shall X be allowed to distribute inflammatory pam-
phlets among crowds protesting an integration order?" Suppose, to compli-
cate matters, Congress had passed a law forbidding such distribution. Can
one predict what the result will be as our Supreme Court is presently con-
258. Miller & Howell, supra note 248, at 675.
259. Dzw-r & Tuo-rs, op. cit. supra note 80, at 224.
260. Miller & Howell, supra note 248, at 691.
261. TourMn, op. cit. supra note 22, at 152-53.
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stituted? But of greater interest, is the method of arriving at principles
which govern such a situation. First of all, the Court can and must decide
a case on the issue if properly presented to it. Two recent writers con-
cluded that
Marbury clearly states that the choice of the premise by the legislature is not
unreviewable; the Court has a duty to review it. We do not say that in that process
the Court is free to indulge in whim or caprice. Surely, in considering the value
choice of the legislature it ought to bring to bear all the wisdom, precedent and
experience which are available. But in the end, it has the final say, and that say,
can neither be preordained nor positively tested by a logical formula. It is the
strong impression to the contrary created by the writings of those who insist in"generality and neutrality" which bothers us. 262
The strong-minded men who have become our justices have not shown
too much reluctance to make a choice, but they have not agreed with one
another-a not unknown condition. But in the forum from which they speak,
there is an opportunity for choice from among genuine alternatives. They
speak for one society; there is a standard (the Constitution and the United
States Reports), and the values of the society are determinable. The re-
maining issue is which, if any, values should be given preference and why,
And what is our ultimate objective? In Brown v. Board of Education,263
it is understood that a segregated public school system violated the four-
teenth amendment by denying the equal protection of the laws. Professor
Wechsler seems to object to the decision because it did not consider a
right of selecting one's associates which is an important value in our
society.2" Assuming that there is such a right and that the Court gave it
fall consideration, what is the standard by which the right of free associa-
tion for the whites could have been rejected? It seems to me that this type
of argument has been considered by our ethical writers.
Toulmin, for example, asserts that "the function of ethics is to correlate,
our feelings and behavior in such a way as to make the fulfillment of every-
one's aims and desires as far as possible compatible."265 An ethical judg-
ment "is used to harmonize people's actions ... *"266 Good reasons are
such as show the tendency of an action towards these ends. Talk in terms
262. Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
571, 588 (1960). The cause of their troubled minds is not clear since Wechsler says:,
"The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before them to.
review the actions of the other branches in the light of constitutional provisions, even
though the action involves value choices, as action invariably does." Wechsler, supra
note 244, at 19. For further wrestling with what Prof. Wechsler meant by neutral
principles, see Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, in ThE Stwmmm
CounT lEvrmv 75, 110 (1960); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional
Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 637, 652 (1961).
263. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
264. Wechsler, supra note 244, at 34.
265. Touusn, op. cit. supra note 22, at 137.
266. Id. at 145.
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of good reasons rather than neutrality might contribute some light on these
subjects.
Turning now to a final issue that may be clarified by the considerations
that have been stressed throughout this essay, let us look at the general
nature of the judicial decision in American courts.
Thirty years ago, a common lay opinion was that judges were, captives
of their economic and social origins and their opinions were expected to be
reflections of this fact. There seemed to be much evidence supporting this
view. But this monistic view has now been largely dissipated. We, like
Dean Pound, find impossible "the reference of every item in the judicial
process, of every single decision and every working out of a legal precept
"by applying the technique of the law to the received materials of decision,
to the operation, conscious or unconscious, of the desires and self interest
of an economically dominant class."26 7
We cannot deny that there are influences bearing down on judges, as on
all men. But in the professionally trained class of judges, "what stands out
in the history of Anglo-American law is the resistance of the taught tradition
in the hands of judges from any class you like .. "8 This is Maitland's
taught law which is such tough law.
The judge, as does all of the legal profession, takes the received precepts
and ideals and uses them in his work. How he finds the law, how he dis-
covers the pertinent principle or analogy of similar facts is the oft-discussed
problem of the logic of the judicial process.269 But our present concern is
with the finished product. How can we decide that the decisions are
good? Good in this context must mean in accordance with the function or
end of law. It has already been indicated that the objective of law is the
establishment of ideal relations among men. This, in turn, is to be under-
stood as the establishment of a system of social control giving effect to
the maximum amount of the needs and wants of a society. The issue now
is whether a procedure can be developed to assure that this end is given
a full consideration in the course of the judicial process.
A Stanford professor of philosophy and law has recently considered this
complex of problems. His book2 70 deserves a close examination because
here is the evidence for the value, if any, of this entire discussion. Here is
the proof that the problems to be solved, the methods of solution, and the
reasoning to be used are the same in ethics and in legal philosophy.
This work is devoted to an analysis of the possible procedures that may
be used in judicial decisions. The purpose of this examination is to see
267. Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Tort*, 53 Htmv. L. REv.
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how these procedures produce decisions that fulfil the functions of a legal
system. The author states that "a-desirable legal system is one that succeeds
in giving maximum effect to the needs, desires, interests, and aspirations
of the members of the society of which it is a part."2 71 The procedure for
success in this effort can be derived by analogy from the procedures of
modem ethics, that is, "moral decisions ought to be justified in the same
way in which legal decisions are justified,"2 72 and, presumably, vice versa.
In accordance with this view, the author rejects a procedure in which
decisions are based upon precedent in which precedent is followed for
the sole reason that it is precedent. Professor Wasserstrom comments that
this method "is ... patently incompatible with all conceptions of progress,
enlightment, and self-correction ... ."273 This is what we concluded with
respect to a deontological ethics which gave no heed to the consequences
of actions. It should be noted, however, that there are important values to
be secured from following precedent. These include certainty and predict-
ability, the ability to rely upon the past, equality among litigants, efficiency
in adjudication, and the avoidance of legal error. Whatever procedure is
ultimately adopted, some provision will have to be made for these values.
From the opposite angle, a procedure of deciding cases may be adopted
that aims solely at rendering justice in the particular case. When this
course is considered, the primary question is how justice is discovered.
According to the author, this theory of particular justification is usually
based upon some nonrational method of reaching a decision. Such methods
include arriving at the just decision by a flash of light, an intuition, or a
hunch. We have had occasion to see what ethical writers think of this
method of reaching a conclusion. Professor Wasserstrom in similar manner
concludes that it "can only be deemed an unwise, ill-conceived, and inde-
fensible normative position."274
The two extreme positions having been disposed of, the author turns
to his own position. He digresses to explain the analogy he is developing.
Modem ethics, he says, has taken to asking for good reasons for moral
decisions and, as evidence, quotes from Toulmin. But there are "two differ-
ent kinds of moral reasons. There are reasons that are relevant to the
criticism or justification of individual actions and there are reasons that are
relevant to social practices and rules."75 These two types of reasons should
both be satisfied in any decision.
The reason for an individual decision in law may be that it follows an
existing precedent or rule. The rule is the social practice whose justification
must next be examined. The rightness of a social practice is determined
271. Id. at 10.
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273. Id. at 56.
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by the extent to which it complies with the function of morality which
"is to encourage conduct that will produce a maximum of happiness or a
minimum of conflict..2..,'76
Applying these views to the procedure for justifying legal decisions, the
author argues that this procedure is a two-level one. Each decision follows
from an existing legal rule. In the usual case, this will be sufficient, but the
rule itself is always open to being tested by the standard of utility or what-
ever the ultimate standard may be. This restricted utilitarian process gains
the advantages of a strict precedential procedure by following and adher-
ing to precedents, by recognizing a prima facie obligation to follow the
precedent and, then, only in a special process, looking beyond to the
reasons justifying the rule.
The author claims that his proposed procedure is both rational and
desirable. The decision must, first of all, be formally deducible from
a legal rule. Secondly, the requirement that legal rules "be conducive to
the production of socially desirable consequences," 277 introduces empirical
inquiry. "The techniques of empirical inquiry are as essential to the pro-
duction of reasoned legal justifications as they are to the successful opera-
tion of any other social program that relies upon the truth or falsity of
descriptive claims."278
V. CONCLUSION
The direction of speculation in this area is what determines the outcome.
Conduct of humans does not appear important when, as with Professor
Adams, "the ultimate objective of philosophical analysis of moral discourse
is to disclose its ontological significance." 79 Nor can it be argued that this
is Moore's interest when he requires that in order to know our duty we
must know the consequences of our acts through all future time throughout
the Universe.
But our own concern here is, and has been, conduct. As Ewing says:
"The problem of what ought to be done is central."SO Pound never tires
of arguing that the law is practical. John Dewey was expressing a similar
view when he declared that "Philosophy ... is willing to abandon its sup-
posed task of knowing ultimate reality and to devote itself to a proximate
human office ...."281
In this practical effort the view we have adopted is not without an onto-
logical basis. We have found no Ideal lying already embedded in Reality.
A unique entity, the Good, was not discovered. All the world consisted of
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was feeling, knowing, and living. The variety and unpredictability of such
a world is no source of anguish to a nominalist who finds no mechanical
movement of history, no pre-existing but binding universals, but only the
free movement of hosts of individuals in great numbers of social groups.
We are unable to know what F. S. C. Northrop calls first-order facts, which
"are the introspected or sensed raw data, antecedent to all theory and all
cultures." He adds that "nature and natural law are the names given for
all first-order facts and their relations."28 The conclusions we are reaching
are sufficiently based on Northrop's second-order facts, known as culture
and living law, cultural facts and artifacts. All we are aware of is man in
society.
With an assumed philosophical foundation along these lines, it will be
realized that Professor Adams' book presented considerable difficulty. His
work has been used in the course of this essay primarily for its critical in-
sights. The author ultimately rejected all forms of ethical naturalism and
then advanced some thoughts of his own. Adams is convinced that there
is a category of reality called "value-requiredness." This puts value into all
parts of nature and makes nature teleological.2 8 3 This is in contrast to our
present concept of modem science being value-free. The conventional
mechanical explanation of the physical world is unsatisfactory to Professor
Adams. He argues that his teleological view does all that the mechanical
theory does and does it better.
Adams' argument on this metaphysics is not as detailed nor as thorough
as his analysis of ethical naturalism. He has no hope of making a wide-
spread conversion. He remarks that "at some point in such cases one has
simply to make a categorical commitment and proceed accordingly."284 One
enters an analysis with a commitment to categories of thought and a pre-
conceived view on the contents of the stuff of experience and how to look
at such experience. And what is the origin of this commitment? Adams
answers that "the categorical features of a natural language consist of the
basic distinctions that the people of one's culture and their ancestors have
noted and found important in their long struggle to come to grips with and
to adjust to reality."28 5
It is my own guess that in our society we are not prepared to find values
necessarily a part of every situation. Science in the modem western world
has insisted that that is not the way we make progress in our thinking. Lon
Fuller must be arguing along these lines proposed by Adams, when he
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attempts to merge fact and value. But, as was widely noted after their
notable debate,26 he was not even intelligible to the naturalist, Ernest
Nagel.
Men in various types of social groups have various needs. Some sort of
control must be exercised to insure that these needs will be satisfied. If we
assume a simple, closed, agrarian society the problem can be simple. The
development of a particular type of personal conduct may be sufficient.
But such societies are rare today. Our modern pluralistic societies contain
within their borders many communities and groups with varying needs and
ideals. A large city needs more law and order than a rural town. The per-
sonal conduct and ideals of the many individuals need some coordination
to avoid chaos-or, in Pound's phrase, friction. The failure of individuals to
live up to their code of personal conduct may lead to situations when it is
desirable for the government to intervene and enforce as mandatory at least
part of the conduct enjoined by ethics. In this sense, law can be described
as minimum ethics, but, of course, it is far more than just that. The ends
of the two are different as was noted. But their methods, their basis in
fact, their testing by consequences are similar and, being so, each has
something to give to the other.
286. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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